


Review and Analysis of the Philadelphia Police Department and Other Related Police Spending



City Controller
Rebecca Rhynhart
October 2022



CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER
1230 Municipal Services Building
1401 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1679
(215) 686-6680 FAX (215) 686-3832

REBECCA RHYNHART
City Controller

October 18, 2022

Commissioner Danielle Outlaw
Philadelphia Police Department
Police Commissioner's Office
400 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Dear Commissioner Outlaw,

Attached is my office's report, *Review and Analysis of the Philadelphia Police Department and Other Related Police Spending*. The review was initiated in response to a request from Philadelphia City Council's Police Reform Working Group with a goal of providing transparency and insight about how PPD spend its budgeted funds and deploys available resources. To assist in the review, the Office of the City Controller engaged Stout Risius Ross, LLC (Stout) with the support of Horsey, Buckner & Heffler, LLP and the Center for Policing Equity. The engagement was performed in accordance with applicable professional standards, including the Statements on Standards for Consulting Services issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).

Our review identified many organizational and operational challenges, including officer staffing shortages, lack of evaluation of Operation Pinpoint, the department's main crime fighting strategy, inequity in 911 response times depending on the neighborhood you live in, a convoluted city system for monitoring and investigating officers out with Heart and Lung cases, outdated systems and processes, and more. Many of these challenges are tied to PPD's allocation of available resources, but that is not to say that more funding is the correct response. As such, this report includes a series of recommendations to address these challenges. Key amongst them, the report recommends that PPD strategically allocate resources in a way that is responsive to the voiced concerns and needs of the communities it serves. We use community in an intentionally broad sense – it means residents and business owners, geographical groupings, including neighborhoods and / or police districts, racial and ethnic groups, religious communities. PPD should seek input from the community in each neighborhood to determine how to allocate spending and deployment of officers to best serve the people of that neighborhood. This approach is a significant departure from PPD's current approach but is the kind of organizational change that will enable the public

feels truly heard and safe, while better enabling officers to do their jobs. It is my hope that this report offers PPD a path forward to reimagine policing to create a safer city. But it will require intentional, strategic guidance and support from the Office of the Mayor, the Managing Director's Office and other city departments.

As part of this review, my office engaged a broad coalition of community and religious leaders and other concerned Philadelphians, called the Community Advisory and Accountability Council,¹ to support the work of this report. Their feedback and insight was integral to this report, contributing throughout the process and ensuring that the review considered the concerns of their neighbors, constituents and fellow residents and truly reflected the rich diversity of Philadelphia. I want to thank them for their time and passion.

Throughout the conduct of this review, I have been impressed by PPD's cooperation with this process. PPD is a vitally important public safety agency with an extremely difficult job to do, and I am heartened by your response to this report (management's written response is included as part of this report). I would like to express my thanks to management and staff for your courtesy and cooperation during this review.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Rebecca Rhynhart', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Rebecca Rhynhart
City Controller

CC: Mayor James F. Kenney
Council President Darrell Clarke
Members of City Council
Tumar Alexander, Managing Director
Christina Pastrana Hernandez, Chief of Staff, Mayor's Office
Kellan White, First Deputy City Controller
Nicole McCormac, Chief of Staff, Office of the City Controller

¹ Members of the Community Council are as follows: Tonya Bah, Phil Cochetti, William Rick Collins, Lydia Currie, Fred Dedrick, Amy Gershenfeld Donnella, Kelcey Duggan, Christopher Gannon, Overseer Christopher Robert Hanna Sr., Tamir Harper, Aubrey Hayes, Kiasha Huling, Jamal Johnson, Sarah Johnston, Anil "Bob" Kothari, Carla Lewandowski, Becky Mer, William D. Markert Jr., Tamika Morales, Richard Speizman, Reverend Mark Tyler, and James Williams.



October 18, 2022

Hon. Rebecca Rhynhart, City Controller
City of Philadelphia – Office of the Controller
Municipal Services Building
1401 JFK Boulevard, 12th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102

Dear Controller Rhynhart,

We have concluded our engagement to perform a Review and Analysis of the Philadelphia Police Department and other related police spending. Stout was retained by the City of Philadelphia – Office of the Controller (the Controller’s Office) and our work was performed to assist in a review of spending, resource allocation, and personnel activities of the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD).


SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The Controller’s Office engaged Stout, with the support of Horsey, Buckner & Heffler, LLP (HBH) and Center for Policing Equity (CPE), to perform a review and analysis of the Philadelphia Police Department and other related police spending.²

The scope of the assessment included PPD spending from FY 2017 to present. Our assessment was structured to address the following five objectives as requested by the Controller’s Office in its Request for Proposals (“RFP”):

1. Analyze PPD spending over the past five years in areas including, but not limited to: deployment, training, detective, and administrative functions, and contracting.
 - a. For at least one year, conduct a detailed analysis of deployment and spending by neighborhood/police district.
2. Identify areas in which PPD over- or under-allocates resources as compared to evidence-based practices and police spending in other major cities. These areas may include, but are not limited to:
 - a. Budgeted officer positions per capita.
 - b. Police spending as compared to the City’s total budget.
 - c. Allocation of resources per neighborhood and/or police district.
3. Analyze metrics to determine the effectiveness of policing as compared to other cities and jurisdictions. Such metrics might include, but are not limited to:
 - a. Violent crime clearance rates.

² Throughout this report, the engagement team of Stout, HBH, and CPE will be collectively referred to as Stout.

- 
- b. 911 call response times.
 4. Recommend improvements to the deployment of resources to better align PPD's allocation of resources with evidence-based practices for equitable policing.
 5. Analyze spending in other departments that would widely be considered police spending by experts.

During the course of its work, Stout conducted interviews with various PPD personnel and other stakeholders. During an initial kick-off meeting between Stout, PPD and the Controller's office, it was determined that Stout's primary contact for this assignment would be Deputy Commissioner Christine Coulter. In addition to the interviews conducted with PPD personnel, Stout also interacted with a number of additional organizations, departments, and individuals. A full list can be found in **APPENDIX A**.

Our interactions with these individuals and organizations have also informed our scope, analyses, findings, and recommendations.



REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER RELATED POLICE SPENDING

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the two years since the civil unrest protests following the killing of George Floyd, conversations about how to achieve public safety while serving the broader needs of the community have been a major focus in cities across the country, with considerable scrutiny of the funding necessary for effective policing. In Philadelphia, the dialogue has been heightened by residents' concerns about public safety and the city's gun violence crisis.


In December 2020, as national tension around the issue of police funding piqued, Philadelphia City Council's Police Reform Working Group requested that the Office of the City Controller (Controller's Office) audit the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD). In the request, Council specifically stated that they, "...have little insight into how PPD is spending its funds." PPD consistently has the largest budget of all the City of Philadelphia's (City) departments, with spending exceeding \$750 million in fiscal year (FY) 2021.

In response to Council's request and pursuant to Section 6-400(c) of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, the Controller's Office undertook a review of PPD's spending and resource allocation. The Controller's Office engaged Stout Risius Ross, LLC to conduct this engagement, with the support of Horsey, Buckner & Heffler, LLP and the Center for Policing Equity. The review sought to understand PPD's budget, actual spending, and its deployment of resources.

KEY FINDINGS

The review found that PPD's budget is not developed with involvement and input from the communities it serves but rather, its budget is generally based on historical spending levels, including headcounts and the perceived needs of different units and programs. This results in a budget that is neither strategically developed nor responsive to or aligned with the voiced concerns and needs of Philadelphians. Additionally, it does not appear that PPD performs any analysis to identify how many positions (officers or civilians) or hours are required each year to meet its public safety goals, hindering PPD's ability to determine the total number of positions needed to respond to the needs of the community.

The review analyzed PPD's actual spending, finding its spending per capita consistent with other large police departments across the country. However, PPD's spending on personnel costs,



approximately 95% of its total spending, was the highest of the departments reviewed, with other large departments averaging approximately 90%.


With about 95% of PPD's funding spent on personnel costs, the review examined PPD's staffing trends in detail. PPD's staffing levels have decreased significantly in recent years, from 6,590 filled uniform positions at the end of FY 2019 to 5,983 at the end of FY 2022. Based on recent attrition and recruiting trends, this total is likely to continue to decrease and could fall below 5,200 by the end of FY 2025 if the department does not increase its recruitment and retention of officers. The number of officers available for duty is further reduced by officers who are out on injured on duty (IOD) claims, which have more than doubled since FY 2018. During the fourth quarter of FY 2022, there were an average of 572 officers unavailable for duty as the result of an IOD claim.

According to PPD and the Finance Department's Office of Risk Management, Heart and Lung cases are not tracked separately from IOD cases. The current system in place for monitoring and investigating Heart and Lung cases is convoluted, lacks accountability, and does not appear to be adequate, based on recently documented instances of abuse³ of the benefit.

Of PPD's approximately 6,000 total officers, only 2,500 are assigned to patrol. In addition to officers assigned to specialized units, many officers (not officers on limited duty) are assigned to positions that conduct administrative work, such as delivering mail. The review found that PPD did not have formalized job descriptions for all positions, making it difficult to assess whether positions could be done by a civilian instead of an officer, a process called civilianization. Moreover, it is difficult to measure performance and make data-driven decisions regarding the allocation and/or deployment of resources without consistent, documented job descriptions.

With 2,500 officers assigned to patrol, the total headcount per district ranges from 70 to 190 officers. It is important to note that officers on IOD claims are still counted by PPD in the total number of officers available in a district for patrol deployment. After accounting for officers out on IOD, as well as other types of leave (such as vacation and sick time), the number of patrol officers available are scheduled to be on duty during one of three eight-hour shifts each day. From FY 2017 to FY 2022, this resulted in an average of approximately 11 officers assigned to low crime districts and 22 officers assigned to high crime districts at any particular time during the day. In FY 2021 and FY 2022, the number of officers available for patrol declined significantly, but these declines were not uniformly distributed across the city. The East division, which includes the city's Kensington neighborhood, experienced the largest overall decline in patrol deployment, with FY 2022's total at 78% of its FY 2017 level. Patrol deployment in the Central division, which includes Center City, experienced the smallest decline, recovering to 92% of its FY 2017 level by FY 2022.

³ Barbara Laker, David Gambacorta, and William Bender, "MIA: Crisis in the Ranks", *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 1, 2022.




Operation Pinpoint is PPD’s primary crime fighting strategy. It was launched in January 2019 as a pilot program with seven pinpoint grids, but rapidly expanded to 45 grids in 2020. Based on discussions with PPD, the decision to expand Operation Pinpoint rapidly and dramatically may have impaired PPD’s ability to effectively implement it and complete a robust evaluation of the program and its component grid strategies. The review found that a formal, independent evaluation of Operation Pinpoint has not been conducted, nor has PPD provided Stout with any evaluations of Operation Pinpoint or indicated that one is underway.

Consistent with national standards, PPD seeks to answer at least 90% of 911 calls within 10 seconds. Between 2017 and 2021, the percentage of 911 calls answered within 10 seconds dramatically decreased from 95% to just 68%. While the decline was most significant between 2020 and 2021, and it appears that some improvement was made in early 2022, PPD has not met this goal since 2018. Additionally, PPD’s time to respond to the highest priority 911 calls was longer than any other large city reviewed.

The analysis also reviewed response times by district, finding the police districts that experienced the longest dispatch response times are concentrated in the city’s Black and Brown communities. Districts with more white residents received faster response times overall, with the districts with the highest concentration of white residents experiencing dispatch response times more than twice as fast as those districts with majority Black and Brown Philadelphians.

In conducting the review, several examples of outdated systems and operational inefficiencies were identified. For example, physical paper documents are hand-delivered across districts by uniformed personnel. This practice is inefficient and a waste of both physical and financial resources. Another example is PPD’s use of a teletype system to electronically disseminate information to be printed and read aloud at the following day’s roll call. According to PPD personnel, creating the teletype takes approximately two hours of an employee’s time each day. This process is redundant and inefficient, as the information could be emailed directly to all districts daily. In combination, such inefficient systems and processes can contribute to financial waste, unproductive labor, and an organizational culture that can struggle to embrace change or feel empowered to pursue new strategies.

The report also includes a review of several key components of policing that could have a direct impact on how Philadelphians perceive the legitimacy of police in their community. These components include, but are not limited to, PPD’s use of body-worn cameras and clearance rates, the share of cases deemed solved by police. Community legitimacy refers to the community’s perception of the police, whether the public has trust and confidence in the police and believe that officers conduct policing activities fairly. Maintaining and strengthening community relationships and interactions in order to improve the perception of the police’s legitimacy is a necessity for improved public safety outcomes in Philadelphia.



According to PPD, all patrol districts and specialized units such as highway patrol, traffic patrol, airport, and strike force will have body-worn cameras within the next year. Body-worn cameras can be an effective tool for improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of a police department in the eyes of the community. However, PPD's usage of body-worn cameras could be improved. Currently, the use of body-worn camera footage is extremely limited - it cannot be used for training purposes and is only very occasionally allowed to be released to the public.

From 2016 to 2020, Philadelphia had the lowest homicide clearance rate of the 10 largest cities in the U.S., significantly lower than the rates for cities of comparable size such as Phoenix and San Antonio. While clearance rates are an imperfect measure of policing effectiveness, they are also intertwined with the public's perception of police and overall legitimacy. While clearance rates may improve through greater community participation in investigations, PPD must first demonstrate a sincere and sustained effort to build trust and legitimacy in the eyes of the community such that residents are willing to participate in such activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This report makes a series of recommendations focused on ways PPD can allocate resources based on the needs of the people and communities it serves, as well as make organization and operational improvements. Key recommendations include:

- PPD should construct a budget centered on the communicated needs of the communities it serves and should determine its personnel and programmatic requirements based on the needs of the community. This process will require the support of the Mayor's Office, Managing Director's Office, and the Finance Office.
- PPD should establish the number of people and amount of labor required to effectively operate within each of PPD's districts and units and PPD should develop an understanding of the responsibilities of each of its employees. By creating formalized job descriptions, PPD can create consistency in roles and responsibilities throughout the department. This will also allow PPD to better understand the resources needed throughout the various districts and units within the department, as well as what roles must be staffed by sworn personnel, and those that could be considered for civilianization.
- Currently, the data maintained by PPD's Safety Office and Risk Management related to Heart and Lung usage is limited and disorganized. PPD should improve the accuracy and consistency of the data collected and tracked related to IOD and leave usage, including the Heart and Lung benefit. In doing so, PPD can better identify instances for further investigation to improve its means of detecting instances of abuse of the system.
- With the guidance of the Managing Director and Finance Director, PPD should work with Risk Management to design a process that better identifies instances that require investigation and takes action against officers who are abusing Heart and Lung.

- PPD should develop continual monitoring systems and community feedback mechanisms to ensure staffing and deployment of officers in each district is adequate for, and informed by, the evolving needs of the community.
- PPD should perform a comprehensive evaluation of Operation Pinpoint. A comprehensive evaluation would enable Philadelphians to be informed about whether Operation Pinpoint is improving public safety, how it is responding to the needs of community, and whether there are unintended or unexpected consequences from the strategy. PPD must also identify opportunities to improve or expand data collection and develop a shared commitment among District Captains for Operation Pinpoint.
- PPD should conduct an on-going assessment of 911 response time to ensure equitable response times across districts and identify opportunities for improvement. PPD should analyze its 911 response at the district level to understand the factors that create inefficiencies and slow response times. In conjunction with the deployment of resources, this analysis can identify potential solutions to improve response times and eliminate inequities that exist across districts.
- PPD should update and modernize its systems and processes to reduce inefficiencies and redundancies, like eliminating unnecessary paper processes.
- PPD should complete the distribution of body-worn cameras and broaden the usage of footage collected by the cameras.
- PPD should collect structured, detailed feedback from the community as part of a long-term, sustainable commitment to community engagement with the goal of creating community-centered policing practices that effectively address community-specific public safety needs.
- The mayor should enable and empower other City departments and agencies to participate in the development and implementation of public safety strategies, such as mental health crisis response.

Additional findings and recommendations are included throughout this report.

CONCLUSION


PPD's reliance on historical budgeting, staffing, and resource allocation practices, as well as its use of outdated technology and processes, limits its ability to be informed about and strategically respond to the varied needs of communities across the city. The findings and recommendations in this report represent an important opportunity to not only improve public safety outcomes but also to build legitimacy and trust with Philadelphia communities through an ongoing dialogue with the public about community concerns and potential solutions to address them. These concerns and possible solutions should directly inform what resources police need and how police invest time, money, and resources.



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Since 2018, Philadelphia has had the highest rate of homicide (per capita) of the top ten largest cities in America. The city reached a grim new milestone in 2021 – the most homicides in its recorded history. If the current trajectory holds, Philadelphia will surpass last year’s record 562 homicides this year.

A January 2022 community survey by Pew Charitable Trust found that 70% of respondents saw crime, drugs, and public safety as the most important issues in the city, an increase of approximately 30 percentage points from 2020’s survey results. More than half of respondents reported not feeling safe in their neighborhood at night and approximately 65% indicated hearing gunshots in their neighborhood in the last year.⁴

At the same time, the Philadelphia Police Department’s (PPD) budget is consistently the largest of the City’s departments, surpassing \$750 million across all funds in fiscal year (FY) 2021.⁵ In December 2020, Philadelphia City Council’s Police Reform Working Group sent a letter requesting that the Office of the City Controller audit PPD, writing they “have little insight into how the PPD is spending its funds.”

The review request came at a time of national, and local, discord about how cities achieve public safety with the level of funding for policing receiving a great deal of scrutiny. This report sought to provide transparency into how PPD spends its budgeted funds and deploys its available resources. Specifically, the review includes analyses of PPD’s budget and spending, staffing trends, including officer demographics, district deployment, 911 response times, and more. This report makes a series of recommendations focused on ways PPD can allocate resources based on the needs of the people and communities it serves, as well as make organization and operational improvements.

1. PPD Budget and Spending


The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) is the fourth largest police department in the country.⁶ It is comprised of two major sections (Regional Operations Command North and Regional Operations Command South), with six divisions (Northwest, Northeast, East, Central, Southwest, and South) divided into 21 police districts.⁷ Police districts are further subdivided into police service areas (PSA), with two to four PSAs per district. Each district has a supervisory structure led by a District Captain who oversees patrol officers, administrative staff, and other lower rank sworn staff. As of June 30, 2022, PPD had 5,983 sworn or uniform officers and 809 civilians that conduct operations for PPD across the city.

⁴ “Pew Poll: Gun Violence, COVID-19 Have Hit Philadelphians Hard.” The Pew Charitable Trusts. June 2022.

⁵ Philadelphia’s fiscal year begins on July 1 and ends on June 30.

⁶ Based on total personnel headcount from 2019 law enforcement census data reported by the FBI.

⁷ A map of police districts is provided in **APPENDIX B**.



The department is divided into several programs with specific responsibilities that support PPD's overall public safety work. These programs include Field Operations, Organizational Support Services, Professional Standards, Criminal Investigations, Intelligence and Homeland Security, Forensics, and Aviation.

PPD is led by a police commissioner who is appointed by and reports to the mayor. The current police commissioner was appointed in December 2019 after a national hiring search.

PPD Budget and Spending Overview

PPD's budget is consistently the largest component of the City's general fund, with annual spending over the past five fiscal years averaging approximately \$730 million from all funds (General Fund, Grants Revenue Fund, and Aviation Fund). PPD's budget is developed by PPD and the City of Philadelphia's Budget Office, which reports to the Office of the Director of Finance, each year during the City's budget process with City Council. It is based on adjustments from the prior year's budget.

Generally, PPD's budget is based on historical spending levels, including headcount and perceived unit/program need. Based on interviews with PPD, it does not appear that it performs any analysis to identify how many people or hours are required each year to meet its public safety goals. Additionally, PPD's budget is not developed with consideration of community needs, broadly and public safety specifically, or with community input.

From FY 2017 to FY 2021, 95-96% of PPD's budget was allocated for personnel costs, including funding for a set number of positions each year, called budgeted positions. Filled positions refers to the actual number of employees. Filled positions also include those individuals who are unable to work or on restricted duty as detailed later in this report. Therefore, the number of filled positions is not an accurate reflection of how many officers are available for work at a given time. The difference between budgeted and filled positions represents vacancies within PPD. These vacancies result in excess funding in PPD's personnel budget, which becomes PPD's budget for overtime for the year.


In most years, PPD manages its overtime to stay within its total personnel spending budget (after accounting for negotiated wage increases) for the year. However, its use of overtime spending is not necessarily indicative of extra work that is required to effectively operate the department. Instead, PPD uses available funds as overtime until it spends its entire personnel budget. Based on interviews with PPD, it does not appear that overtime is analyzed for strategic or effective use.

In addition to PPD's budget, there are a number of costs related to PPD that are planned for in other City departments' budgets (as detailed later in this section), such as litigation costs in the Law Department budget, and public safety officers and crossing guard personnel costs and 911 programming in the Managing Director's Office budget.

PPD Budget, FY 2017 – FY 2021

PPD’s all funds budget⁸ increased each fiscal year from \$686.9 million in FY 2017 to \$773.4 million in FY 2020, before decreasing to \$757.2 million in FY 2021. However, the reduction in PPD’s budget was the result of \$14.8 million in funding for school crossing guards and public safety employment officers being reallocated out of PPD’s budget to the Managing Director’s Office budget. Another \$2.6 million for police related activities was included in the Managing Director’s Office FY 2021 budget, including \$2.2 million for the Police Assisted Diversion Program⁹ and \$400,000 for the establishment of the new Citizens Police Oversight Commission.¹⁰ If the \$14.8 million reallocated to the Managing Director’s Office and \$2.6 million for other policing related activities in FY 2021 were included in PPD’s budget, PPD’s budget would have totaled \$774 million in FY 2021, equal to PPD’s budget in FY 2020.

Despite the decrease in PPD’s budget, its FY 2021 budget is generally consistent with budgets in many other large U.S cities, ranking fifth of the ten largest police departments per capita (2020 U.S. Census population):




Regardless of fluctuations in PPD’s budget over the last five fiscal years, PPD’s budget by spending type has remained consistent, with the majority of its budget allocated to personnel costs.

⁸ Includes funding from the General Fund, Grants Revenue, and Aviation Fund.

⁹ The Police Assisted Diversion Program is discussed further in **COMMUNITY LEGITIMACY**.

¹⁰ The Police Oversight Commission, which is currently transitioning into the Citizens Police Oversight Commission (CPOC), is designed to “review and improve police officer conduct, to help hold the Police Department accountable for officers’ actions, to enhance the quality of internal investigations of alleged misconduct, to add transparency to the disciplinary process, to establish a clear process for the submission and consideration of complaints of police misconduct, and to improve communication between the community and the Police Department” and provides oversight of PPD’s policies, practices, and customs.

As shown in the chart below, PPD allocated an average of 95.3% of its budget to personnel spending (employee compensation) over the five-year period of FY 2017 to FY 2021.¹¹




PPD’s level of personnel spending is consistent with other large police departments nationwide, however PPD’s average personnel costs as a percent of total budget was the highest among the 10 largest departments, as show in the chart below.^{12,13} While PPD’s personnel spending share averaged 95% from FY 2017 to FY 2021, the other nine departments averaged 90% over the same period.

¹¹ Percentages shown in the chart represent amount of PPD’s budget allocated to employee compensation.

¹² Largest police departments determined from FBI data.

¹³ See annual budgets for each police department, *available at* <https://www.phila.gov/departments/office-of-the-director-of-finance/financial-reports> (Philadelphia), <https://council.nyc.gov/budget/> (New York), <https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/obm/provdrs/budget.html> (Chicago), <https://lacontroller.org/budgets/> (Los Angeles), <http://houstontx.gov/budget/> (Houston), <https://dallascityhall.com/departments/budget/financialtransparency> (Dallas), <https://cfo.dc.gov/> (Washington DC), <https://www.sanantonio.gov/budget> (San Antonio), <https://www.phoenix.gov/budgetsite> (Phoenix), and <https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/Pages/Budget.aspx> (Las Vegas).

Average Percent of Budget Spent on Personnel, FY 2017 - FY 2021




Overtime spending accounted for 8% of the total PPD personnel budget in FY 2021. In most years, PPD manages its overtime to stay within its total personnel budget (after accounting for negotiated wage increases). The largest difference between overtime spending and budgeted overtime occurred in FY 2020 when overtime spending exceeded the budgeted amount by \$13.5 million. In June 2020 (the last month of the fiscal year), PPD incurred \$14.3 million in necessary overtime due to the civil unrest in the city. At this point in the year, PPD had already used most of its budgeted overtime and was unable to reduce future overtime spending given the limited time remaining in the fiscal year. According to PPD, if this overtime had occurred earlier in the year, they would have managed future overtime throughout the rest of the year to compensate for the sudden increase.

PPD Personnel Spending, FY 2021

The vast majority of PPD’s budget is spent on its people, with more than \$723.8 million allocated to personnel costs in FY 2021. As shown in the chart below, PPD budgets most of its personnel costs by program to Field Operations (53%), including 40% for PPD District operations.

Total FY 2021 PPD Personnel Budget: \$723.8 Million




This allocation of costs represents the budgeted expense for each position within a particular program (filled or unfilled), which is based on historical headcounts, perceived needs within a particular program or unit in consideration of the funds that will be made available by the City’s Budget Office. Stout observed that PPD does not analyze its staffing levels from an operational efficiency perspective, forcing it to rely on historical past practices and staffing allocations methods. This results in a budget which is not developed strategically, and therefore may not be aligned with the needs of the community.

Other significant categories include 19% of personnel costs for Criminal Investigations, comprised of the Specialized Investigations unit and Detective Bureau, and 12% for Organizational Support Services, comprised of the Standards and Accountability unit and Office of Professional Responsibility.

Overtime

PPD utilizes two types of overtime: non-reimbursable and reimbursable. Non-reimbursable refers to traditional overtime, or additional hours worked outside of an employee’s regular scheduled hours for additional compensation. Non-reimbursable overtime, such as Crime Plan, (which, according to interviews with PPD, is an overtime code used for additional patrol duties in response to crime activity in a given district), is assigned at the discretion of the District Captain. Based on interviews with District Captains, some allocate overtime based on a rotating basis to ensure all



officers have an opportunity for it, while others stated they consider other factors, such as officer experience, when allocating overtime. The Reimbursable Overtime Program was “established to provide the private sector with the opportunity to contract for sworn police personnel, not scheduled for district/unit assignment, and equipment at established rates to serve as an additional deterrent to crime through their presence.”¹⁴ Additionally, certain special events can be eligible for reimbursable overtime. Reimbursable overtime is offered on a rotating basis to officers from a pre-determined list.

PPD tracks overtime using overtime codes in its Daily Attendance Record (DAR) system. Between FY 2017 and FY 2021, PPD had 22 overtime codes with amounts greater than \$1 million. In reviewing the overtime codes used from FY 2017 through FY 2021, it is apparent that while PPD tracks overtime, the department’s inconsistent use and occasional creation of new individual codes prevents overtime from being accurately recorded for monitoring and planning purposes. For example, the overtime code Exhibitions is listed as “Exhibitions (General Public Shows, Ice Follies, Sportsman Show, etc.)” in the DAR system. PPD stated that in practice, however, they were not exactly sure how the Exhibitions code was used. According to PPD, some major events may end up on the Exhibitions code, and some may have their own code created. This is evident in reviewing the Exhibition code’s share of overall overtime: In FY 2017, 2018 and 2019, just 1% of all overtime was coded to Exhibitions, but in FY 2020 and 2021 its share ballooned to 16% and 29%, respectively. In FY 2020, this increase was a result of overtime coded to Exhibitions for civil unrest protests, more than \$14 million in June 2020 alone.

The Reimbursable Overtime Program detail states that “Each officer, while performing services under this contract, is to be considered “on-duty” and may be called away from the Company’s location for emergency situations as determined solely by the Philadelphia Police Department.”¹⁵

In discussions with Stout, some District Captains stated that if a district has fewer available officers on a given day, they will reassign an officer from reimbursable overtime to regular patrol if needed. They also indicated that they try to fill Crime Plan overtime before assigning reimbursable overtime. Despite these statements, reimbursable overtime is consistently one of the highest used overtime codes (16-24% of all overtime).

In interviews with PPD, Stout was told that overtime is used to address staffing shortages. This overtime should be coded to either Crime Plan or Absentee Replacement. Notably, overtime use coded as Crime Plan increased every year between FY 2017 and FY 2020 (15-25%), before dropping dramatically in FY 2021 (6%). The decrease in Crime Plan overtime in FY 2021 suggests the department is either spending significantly less on overtime for strategic patrol initiatives, or, as described above, there is an issue with coding overtime consistently. Additionally, PPD’s use of the Absentee Replacement code averaged 5% from FY 2017 to FY 2021. Despite the decrease in available officers (detailed in **UNIFORM STAFFING TRENDS**), Absentee Replacement was

¹⁴ “Police Resource Request,” *available at* <https://phl.secure.force.com/ROWS/>

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

consistently \$4 to \$5 million annually over this time period. A complete list of overtime spending by code from FY 2017 to FY 2021 is provided in **APPENDIX C**.

Litigation Spending

Costs for litigation related to PPD are not included in its budget, but rather are included in the City of Philadelphia’s Finance Department budget and spending. Based on information provided by the Law Department, the total amounts spent on settlements of civil rights and labor and employment cases related to the police department since FY 2017 are as follows:

TABLE 1: SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS RELATED TO PPD, FY 2017 – FY 2022

Description	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	Total
Civil Rights Unit	\$10,400,000	\$21,000,000	\$20,970,000	\$14,700,000	\$18,300,000	\$20,700,000	\$106,070,000
Labor/Employment	1,400,000	427,000	129,000	305,000	143,000	-	2,404,000
Total	\$11,800,000	\$21,427,000	\$21,099,000	\$15,005,000	\$18,443,000	\$20,700,000	\$108,474,000


Total litigation and settlement costs paid by the Law Department from FY 2017 to FY 2022 were \$297 million.^{16,17} PPD settlements made up 37% of all litigation and settlement expenses for the City. The Law Department indicated that the amounts shown above are not comprehensive. The costs include only settlements and payments made related to civil rights cases, which include offenses such as wrongful conviction and excessive use of force, and labor and employment cases, such as sexual harassment. Additional Law Department costs related to PPD potentially include torts cases, costs associated with conflict counsel, and Law Department overhead associated with dealing with PPD-related litigations, however some, but not all, of these costs are tracked by the Law Department on a department basis.

Recommendations

- Incorporate community feedback in its budget process.** As discussed throughout the remainder of this report, effective policing strategies should be based on and responsive to the needs of the community. As such, PPD should construct a budget centered on the communicated needs of the communities it serves and should determine its personnel and programmatic requirements based on the needs of the community. This process will require the support of the Mayor’s Office, Managing Director’s Office, and the Finance Office. PPD should meaningfully and regularly engage the community to understand their expectations and desires. It should focus on an effort to assess community concerns by utilizing a combination of surveys, focus groups, and individual interviews. Further, as discussed in the **DISTRICT DEPLOYMENT** and **911 RESPONSE** sections below, it should analyze police calls for service and feedback from the community to determine if police

¹⁶ According to the City of Philadelphia Law Department.

¹⁷ Litigation and settlement costs are shown for the year in which the litigation and settlement costs are paid out. The payment does not necessarily coincide with the date in which the inciting incident occurred.



officers are the right responder for all calls and if the allocation of their time, and the nature of their presence, is consistent with community expectations. Using these techniques, and others, PPD's budget will be rooted in an effort to continually build trust and legitimacy with the community, focusing on protecting and responding to the needs of residents.

- **Determine budget allocations based on efficient use of resources.** PPD's current resource allocation is primarily based on historical spending and headcount within the department. PPD should establish the number of people and amount of labor required to effectively operate within each of PPD's districts and units, to better determine the amount of funding truly needed, and potentially identify opportunities to better allocate funds.
- **Budget overtime based on expected activity.** Currently, the amount of budgeted overtime is based on a surplus of funds which remain after accounting for salaries for budgeted personnel. In tandem with its development of resource requirements for its districts and units, PPD should develop its overtime budget based on the expected actual activity within its districts and units, and the need for overtime hours that that activity creates. By budgeting overtime in this manner, PPD can potentially create opportunities to allocate funds in places other than personnel, such as investments in programs and initiatives that improve PPD's effectiveness and engagement with the community.
- **Standardize overtime code usage to improve accuracy of overtime tracking.** PPD is inconsistent in the manner in which it utilizes overtime codes to track overtime activity. The department should review the overtime codes currently in DAR, eliminate redundant or obsolete codes, and develop a standardized list of overtime codes with instructions for the corresponding activity to be classified within each code. By improving its tracking of overtime, PPD will in turn be able to improve its monitoring and analysis of overtime usage and its planning for future officer deployment and overtime assignments.


2. Uniform Staffing Trends

As discussed in the previous section, PPD's budgeted positions are not based on an assessment of the amount of personnel necessary for the department to operate effectively in response to community needs. Rather, PPD's approach to budgeting, staffing, and resource allocation is largely based on historical staffing levels. While the sworn strength (the budgeted number of officers) decreased slightly in FY 2021, the decision to do so was not based on an evaluation of the number of officers currently needed by the department to meet the public safety needs of Philadelphians, or for units to operate as required. Instead, the budgeted number was revised down slightly as the number of filled uniform positions had consistently been below the number of budgeted positions.¹⁸

A summary of PPD's sworn officers, including the impact of officers out on injured on duty (IOD) status, by fiscal quarter is shown in the chart below. It is important to note that there has been a

¹⁸ Quarterly City Managers Report for the Period Ending June 30, 2022, City of Philadelphia Budget Office, available at <https://www.phila.gov/media/20220818093154/Quarterly-City-Managers-Report-June-30-2022-1.pdf>.

significant increase in IOD status in recent years, which further reduces officers available for patrol. As such, the chart depicts the budgeted number of officers, filled positions as reported in the Quarterly City Manager’s Report, and the “actual” number of officers available to the department, after accounting for officers on No Duty status for each month since FY 2009:¹⁹




As shown above, PPD’s budgeted for 6,979 uniform positions at the end of FY 2009, and a total of 6,762 of those budgeted positions were filled. By the end of FY 2022, filled uniform positions decreased to 5,983 officers and the gap between filled and budgeted positions grew to 534 officers. As the number of officers on IOD status increased over this period, there were only 5,411 officers available for duty at the end of FY 2022, more than 1,000 officers below the budgeted level of 6,517.

This section will focus on the demographics of PPD’s uniform officers, the total number of officers available for patrol and the impact current attrition and recruitment trends have on officer headcount in the future, as well as opportunities for PPD to increase the number of officers available.

Patrol Officer Demographics

Research has demonstrated that a more diverse police force can lead to improved interactions between the police and the communities they serve. For example, a recent study of the Chicago Police Department showed that Black and Hispanic officers make far fewer stops and arrests and use less lethal force than white officers, with the largest differences for interactions with non-white

¹⁹ Officers on Restricted Duty or Limited Duty are still included in the “actual” filled positions depicted in the chart. From FY 2009 to FY 2022, there were an average of 177 officers on Restricted or Limited Duty at the beginning of the fiscal year.



residents.²⁰ Racial diversity among officers supports racial competency. Moreover, when members of the community see themselves reflected in the officers serving their community, it can increase community trust. Additionally, there is a strong body of research that has shown the critical importance of female officers in a police force. According to this research, female officers are also less likely to use lethal and/or excessive force, are named in fewer complaints and lawsuits, are perceived as more honest and compassionate, and make fewer discretionary arrests.²¹

As such, understanding the demographics of PPD officers is important, particularly the diversity of patrol officers, as these officers have the most frequent interactions with residents across the city. This section reviews demographic data for PPD uniform patrol officers in FY 2021 and compared it with Philadelphia's 2020 Census data. PPD's patrol officers were whiter and more male than Philadelphia residents as a whole.²² Patrol officers were 52% white (vs. 34% for all residents) and 22% female (vs. 53% for all residents). Asian and Hispanic patrol officers were underrepresented, making up 8% and 15% of city residents but only 2% and 10% of officers, respectively. Black patrol officers were only slightly underrepresented, accounting for 36% of all patrol officers but 38% of residents. However, PPD does have strong representation of Black female patrol officers; 55% of all female patrol officers identify as Black or African American.

Philadelphia community members have expressed concerns that officers policing in their community are not reflective of the people in their community. Residents are most likely to interact with patrol officers in their immediate district or those surrounding it, so it is important to examine demographic trends at a level more granular than the overall, citywide data. Philadelphia is also one of the most racially segregated cities in the United States,²³ with significant variations in racial composition across the city's neighborhoods. When analyzing patrol officer diversity at the division level, there are some noteworthy trends, particularly in areas with the most non-white residents.²⁴ For example, 61% of patrol officers in the City's East division are white, in comparison to 27% of residents in the area. Residents in the East division are primarily Hispanic (46%), and this division does have the largest share of Hispanic patrol officers (20%), although they are still underrepresented relative to the resident population. In the Northeast division, white patrol officers account for 73% of the total, but only 45% of residents in the area are white. Asian representation is particularly low in this division, with Asian patrol officers accounting for 2% of the total while Asian residents account for 11% of the population. Finally, in the Northwest division, a majority Black area (63%) of the city, Black patrol officers only account for 43% of the total.


²⁰ Bocar A. Ba, "The role of officer race and gender in police-civilian interactions in Chicago," *Science*, Feb. 2021.

²¹ 30x30 Police Initiative, *available at* <https://30x30initiative.org>.

²² Includes all uniform officers that are part of PPD's Patrol Operations and are assigned to a police district, irrespective of rank, as of June 16, 2021.

²³ Aseem Shukla, and Michaëlle Bond, "Philly remains one of the most racially segregated cities in America", *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 19, 2021.

²⁴ Resident demographics have been estimated for each police division using data on race and ethnicity from the 2020 census at the block group level.



Understanding this demographic data presents an opportunity for PPD to improve representation overall, as is recommended by the Department of Justice in *Importance of Police-Community Relationships and Resources for Further Reading*.²⁵ Improving PPD’s overall representation, combined with strategic decision-making regarding diversity during the processes of officer recruitment (see “Recruitment” subsection) and new officer assignment, can create improved public safety outcomes and interactions between the community and the police across Philadelphia’s police districts. It is worth noting that PPD recently hired the department’s first-ever diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) officer,²⁶ an important step toward improving diversity and inclusion within the department overall and relative to the communities it serves.

Heart and Lung

When an officer is injured while on duty, he becomes eligible for worker benefits under the City’s employee disability program. The primary benefits for police officers are Civil Service Regulation 32: Injury and Disability; and Heart and Lung. Heart and Lung is an independent benefit created by the Pennsylvania state legislature intended to provide eligible individuals temporarily injured in the performance of their duties with their full salary, tax-free,²⁷ while on leave. Heart and Lung recipients continue to accrue vacation and sick time, as well as years served toward their pension while on leave. There is no limit as to how long an officer can remain on Heart and Lung, except for if their injury is deemed permanent. Civil Service Regulation 32, on the other hand, encapsulates all other injured on duty claims by PPD. According to the City of Philadelphia’s Office of Risk Management (Risk Management),²⁸ which administers the City’s employee disability benefit including Heart and Lung and Regulation 32, the distinction is Regulation 32 is for officers injured during the course and scope of their employment, rather than injured in the performance of their duties. If an officer is injured at work, they report their injury to PPD’s Safety Office, who refers the officer to one of the City’s disability panel health providers. If the health provider deems the officer’s injury to be “disabling”, the officer is given the option to transfer their care from the disability panel provider to a Heart and Lung doctor. Heart and Lung designated doctors are appointed by the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #5 (FOP).

Recent reporting by the *Philadelphia Inquirer* has highlighted issues with Heart and Lung. Specifically, the reporting stated that Philadelphia, which had 11% of all sworn officers listed as IOD in September 2021, has a higher rate of injured officers than cities such as Chicago (3.3%), Portland, Oregon (1.9%), Tampa (1.0%), and Phoenix (0.6%)²⁹ and identified numerous instances


²⁵ “Importance of Police-Community Relationships and Resources for Further Reading,” Department of Justice, available at <https://www.justice.gov/file/1437336/download>

²⁶ Jad Sleiman, “Philly PD introduces first-ever diversity, equity, and inclusion chief,” April 19, 2022, available at <https://why.org/articles/philly-pd-introduces-first-ever-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-chief/>

²⁷ Heart and Lung salaries are local, state, and federal tax exempt.

²⁸ The Office of Risk Management is a unit within the Finance Office and is separate from PPD. Both PPD and Finance report to the mayor.

²⁹ Barbara Laker, David Gambacorta, and William Bender, “MIA: Crisis in the Ranks”, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 1, 2022.



of potential fraud and / or abuse of the benefit by PPD officers. This report set out to better understand Heart and Lung usage and how abuse of the benefit is addressed. What we found was a convoluted process involving PPD, Risk Management, and Risk Management's third-party program administrator (PMA Management Corp), with inadequate data collection and analysis, limited oversight from both the City and the Pennsylvania Commonwealth (State), and a reactionary investigatory process rather than a proactive process in which potential abuse is identified and investigated.

According to both Risk Management and PPD, Heart and Lung cases are not tracked separately from IOD cases. The data maintained by PPD's Safety Office is minimal, and in some cases unreliable. The Safety Office manually tracks the average number of officers on IOD since 2008 and maintains a database of all injuries suffered on duty by officers since 1998, in addition to an Excel spreadsheet of current officer status. However, none of the information denotes if an officer is on Heart and Lung or Regulation 32. When asked for Heart and Lung information specifically, PPD said IOD and Heart and Lung were interchangeable and provided only IOD data extracts. The Safety Office did provide a limited data extract of select files for officers on IOD. The data had clear limitations and multiple instances of human error, including inaccuracies in length of leave fields (for example, an officer's end date was before its start date for its IOD claim).

In interviews with Stout, Risk Management stated that information related to Heart and Lung was tracked by its third-party administrator in an electronic case file system. However, the data is documented in the individual case files held on the system. Risk Management also noted that its process relies on the information about officers maintained by PPD's Safety Office. PPD similarly stated that it cannot categorize officers as on Heart and Lung without additional information from Risk Management's third-party administrator.

Considering the data deficiencies, it is unlikely that a comprehensive analysis of IOD is occurring by Risk Management, its third-party administrator or PPD. This is particularly important given the impact officers out on IOD has on PPD's available workforce. While officers who are on leave because of injury do not factor into the staffing decline which PPD has experienced in recent years, they further impact the department by decreasing the number of available staff to carry out police duties.

According to Risk Management, there are many offices involved in monitoring Heart and Lung, including Risk Management, its third-party administrator, the City's disability management unit, and medical providers. According to Risk Management, its review of injury claims is conducted at the 90-day and six-month mark, however no detail regarding what the review entailed was provided. According to Risk Management, it responds to tips about potential abuse and noted that PPD and other partners, such as the Controller's Office, Office of the Inspector General and District Attorney's Office, are able to investigate potential abuse of the benefit. (The Controller's Office has reviewed individual tips it has received from the public; however, it has not received any investigation requests from Risk Management or PPD related to abuse of this benefit since at least 2018.) Risk Management also indicated that PPD often relies on Risk Management to follow



up on instances reported. In interviews with Risk Management, they indicated that their third-party administrator does not have a formal process of reviewing and investigating Heart and Lung claims for potential abuse.

Risk Management also said that whether an investigation occurs is determined on a case-by-case basis and that there was no formal investigative process procedure to follow. In interviews with PPD about monitoring and oversight of Heart and Lung, PPD stated that the lack of a formal investigation process and the number of parties involved in monitoring and investigating Heart and Lung without clear guidance on roles and responsibilities is concerning. The current process may result in individuals who are abusing the benefit not being identified or not being investigated and therefore continuing to use the benefit inappropriately.

If fraud or abuse of Heart and Lung is identified, Risk Management stated that the officer will be removed from the benefit and required to return to work.³⁰ According to Risk Management, any IOD claim can be appealed by either the officer or Risk Management. When an appeal occurs, the case is heard by an arbitration panel. It does not appear that arbitration panel results are tracked outside of the individual case files. This limits the ability for useful data analysis to be conducted.


The current documentation and data collection efforts related to Heart and Lung is inadequate for appropriate State or City oversight. Based on the information received from Risk Management, it does not appear that there are any additional oversight efforts by the City related to Heart and Lung were occurring beyond its work. Risk Management stated that even though Heart and Lung is a State benefit, the State provides no oversight or monitoring of the benefit. While a State oversight program is worth exploring, the City should also consider providing additional oversight of this benefit.

IOD Spending and Officer Impact

As shown in the chart below, PPD's IOD spending, which includes spending for Heart and Lung, has increased each year since FY 2017, increasing from \$23.1 million in FY 2017 to \$44.2 million in FY 2021. IOD spending was projected to increase again in FY 2022 to nearly \$51 million (projected as of FY 2022 Q3).

³⁰ Risk Management stated that in some instances, cases may be referred to the District Attorney's Office.

PPD IOD Spending, FY 2017 - FY 2022



According to PPD expenditure data from the City's Financial Accounting Management Information System (FAMIS), 80% of PPD's IOD spending from FY 2017 to FY 2021 went to personnel assigned to Field Operations and the remaining 20% to other units, such as Administrative Services, Airport District, Forensics, Homeland Security, Specialized Investigations, and Standards and Accountability.

When an officer is on IOD, he may be deemed as no, limited, or restricted duty. Based on data maintained by PPD's Safety Office, the average number of officers on limited or restricted duty has fluctuated from year to year, ranging from approximately 55 to 110 officers. On the other hand, the number of officers on no duty status has more than doubled since the start of FY 2018, as shown in the chart below.^{31,32}

³¹ Includes all uniform officers on IOD status, irrespective of assignment or rank.

³² Stout received a limited extract of select data fields (with no personally identifiable information) and noted several instances in which, whether as a result of data limitations or manual error, the length of time an individual was on IOD leave could not be determined. The instances with obvious data issues or apparent errors were excluded from this analysis. However, it is possible that other limitations to the accuracy of the data provided by the Safety Office exists.


Average Number of Officers on No Duty, Quarterly since FY 2009



Source: Data provided by PPD Safety Office

As the number of officers on no duty increased dramatically since FY 2018, there was a corresponding increase in the average length of time officers spent on IOD leave. As shown in the chart below, the leave duration has remained at elevated levels since the increase in FY 2018.


IOD Leave Usage by Fiscal Year



Source: Analysis of data provided by PPD Safety Office

The number of instances in which an individual has taken IOD leave in excess of one year for a single injury has also increased each year since FY 2017:

Number of IOD Absences Longer than One Year




Source: Data provided by PPD Safety Office

Attrition

Several of the personnel Stout interviewed at PPD indicated that officer retention was a significant issue for the department. Between FY 2017 and FY 2022, more than 1,850 officers left the department. As shown in the chart below, annual totals for officers leaving the department range from 257 to 408 officers.³³ Prior to FY 2021, attrition rates averaged 4.3% but have since increased in FY 2021 and FY 2022 to 5.2% and 6.6%, respectively.

Total Officer Attrition, FY 2017 - FY 2022



Note: Attrition rates calculated using actual uniform headcount as the start of each fiscal year.

While PPD's loss of officers has been substantial for the department, its rate of attrition is similar, if not slightly less, than those of police departments in other large cities. For example, the FY 2022

³³ Includes all uniform officers who have left the department, irrespective of assignment or rank.

rate for the New York Police Department was 8.2%,³⁴ and Chicago's rate was 8.5% in 2021,³⁵ as compared to 6.6% for PPD in FY 2022. According to a recent survey by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), police departments with at least 500 sworn officers experienced an average attrition rate of 9.1% for the period from April 1, 2020 to April 1, 2021.³⁶

While PPD's attrition is consistent with, if not less than, other large police departments, it remains a serious challenge for PPD. DROP enrollment and retirements play a role in attrition, but PPD has the opportunity to focus on officer retention as a means to reduce attrition.

DROP

PPD officers who are at least 50 years old with at least 10 years of service can elect to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Plan ("DROP").³⁷ When an officer elects to participate in DROP, their monthly pension benefit is credited to a tax-deferred interest-bearing account, and the individual can continue to work for a maximum of four additional years. Upon retirement, the officer begins to receive their monthly pension benefit, as well as the accumulated balance in their DROP account.³⁸

The number of uniform officers who enrolled in DROP increased dramatically in FY 2021, during which 358 officers enrolled in the program.³⁹ The driving factor for this increase is unclear, though the COVID-19 pandemic and civil unrest in June 2020 may have played a role. The number of new enrollments in DROP in FY 2022 was more consistent with prior years, with 196 officers enrolling in the program:

³⁴ "Report on the Fiscal 2023 Preliminary Plan and the Fiscal 2022 Mayor's Management Report for the New York Police Department" *available at* <https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2022/03/NYPD.pdf>.

³⁵ "Chicago police 'brain drain'? Retirements have stabilized, but 660 cops retired in 2021, almost twice as many as in 2018," *Chicago Tribune*, March 28, 2022, *available at* <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-cpd-police-retirements-20220328-vfyqfwyuzgspjlszucyhchzoy-story.html>.


³⁶ "PERF Special Report: Survey on Police Workforce Trends", Police Executive Research Forum, *available at* <https://www.policeforum.org/workforcesurveyjune2021>.

³⁷ "Reference Guide & Summary Description of Plans A, B, D, J, L, X, Y, 10 and 16", Board of Pensions and Retirement, Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System, July 2022, *available at* <https://www.phila.gov/media/20220706113720/Pension-plan-reference-guide-and-summary-202207.pdf>.

³⁸ "Summary Plan Description: Plan A, Plan B, Plan L, Plan Y, Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement", Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement, Revised May 2013, *available at* <https://www.phila.gov/pensions/PDF/Plan%2087.pdf>.

³⁹ Includes all uniform officers who have enrolled in DROP, irrespective of assignment or rank.

New Officer Enrollments in DROP by Fiscal Year



In addition to new DROP enrollments, there are also a significant number of PPD employees who are either currently eligible for DROP, or who will become eligible within the next few years. In FY 2021, PPD's uniform workforce had an average age of 44, with more than one-third (34%) at least 50 years old, and thus eligible for DROP. Given this large share of older officers, officers enrolling in DROP will likely continue to have a significant impact on PPD's staffing in coming years. Of the 5,218 PPD officers who are not enrolled in DROP, 1,349 officers (26%) are currently eligible to enroll, and an additional 180 to 200 officers will become eligible to enroll in DROP in each of the next five fiscal years.


Recruitment

PPD solicits new recruits throughout the year by attending community events, college fairs, and by hosting information sessions for interested candidates. As of June 2022, there were six dedicated recruiters in PPD. PPD has consistently maintained a recruiting team of this size over the past several years. The recruiters are uniform officers, each assigned to a different geographic area within the City of Philadelphia.

Once an individual has expressed interest in joining PPD, they must be approved for civil service by the City's Office of Human Resources. Candidates who have been certified for civil service are then assessed by PPD's Recruitment and Background Investigations divisions prior to being granted admission to the police academy. During this time, candidates undergo a reading test, an agility test, an interview with an investigator, medical and psychological examinations, and a polygraph test. After successful completion of these evaluations, candidates must receive final approval from the Commissioner's Office, after which they are enrolled in the police academy. According to PPD, on average, the recruit process from the time an individual expresses interest in joining PPD until they are approved to enroll in the academy takes approximately six months. Academy training takes approximately 10 months.

As shown in the chart below, PPD recruit classes have decreased in size since FY 2018. In total, PPD graduated 1,261 new officers from its recruit classes between FY 2017 to FY 2022. However, 58% of these new recruits were in FY 2017 or FY 2018. PPD averaged 175 recruit graduates in FY 2019, 2020, and 2022 (inclusive of FY 2022 recruits who have not yet graduated from the academy but are currently assigned to the force). It is worth noting that PPD had no new recruit classes in FY 2021. In FY 2021, PPD’s budget was reduced by \$16 million, and its budgeted headcount was reduced from 7,609 to 7,456.

PPD Recruiting Class Graduates, FY 2017 - FY 2022



In 2020, Philadelphia’s City Council passed legislation requiring an individual to live in Philadelphia for a minimum of one year prior to being eligible to join the police force. This residency requirement was among the most restrictive nationwide, as Boston was the only other instance among the 30 most populous cities in the U.S. to require a year of residency prior to employment.⁴⁰ As of April 7, 2022, Philadelphia has lifted the requirement that police officers live in the city for one year prior to employment.⁴¹

PPD is aware of its ongoing staffing decline and has had internal discussions on ways to increase recruitment. PPD commissioned a study, which was completed in October 2021, by Collaborative Reform Initiative Technical Assistance Center (CRI-TAC) that examined PPD’s recruitment, hiring, and retention efforts. The study identified a number of shortcomings in PPD’s recruitment

⁴⁰ Larry Eichel and Katie Martin, “In Philadelphia, Prospective Municipal Employees Must Be City Residents for a Year Before Applying”, Pew, *available at* <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2020/10/28/in-philadelphia-prospective-municipal-employees-must-be-city-residents-for-a-year-before-applying>.

⁴¹ Waiver no. 2357, signed March 29, 2022, *available at* <https://www.phila.gov/departments/office-of-human-resources/careers/residency-waivers/#/>.

strategy and included several recommendations for improvement. PPD has stated that it has begun to implement some of these recommendations. The report’s findings regarding data collection are particularly important, as systematic and robust data collection is necessary to not only identify the most successful recruitment strategies, but also to identify at which point in the recruitment process diverse and female candidates are most likely to exit. PPD should continue to implement recommendations from the CRI-TAC report, with a particular emphasis on recommendations aimed at increasing the share of Black, Hispanic, and Asian officers, as well as women officers.

Additionally in its Crime Prevention and Violence Reduction Plan,⁴² PPD listed “Development of a Recruitment Pipeline” as part of its action plan for the Community Engagement and Inclusion area and specifically listed “difference in demographics / diversity” as a potential consideration.⁴³ As previously noted, PPD hired its first DEI officer in April 2022. During a press conference announcing her hiring, the new DEI officer stated that her first priority is to gather all of the information from the department to determine next steps.⁴⁴

Based on interviews with PPD, one approach under consideration to increase recruitment is the implementation of a paid cadet program. PPD stated they were reviewing Washington D.C.’s model, which has a Cadet Corps available for 17- to 24-year-olds. PPD stated that a paid program could be implemented in addition to the existing Police Explorer Cadet Program, and roughly estimates that a program of up to 30 cadets could cost between \$800,000 and \$1.2 million.

Projected Net Effect of Sworn Staffing Trends


As shown previously in the chart on page 11, actual PPD filled uniform positions as of June 30, 2022 were 5,983, which is 534 officers short of the FY 2022 budgeted strength of 6,517. The current attrition rate, increase in DROP enrollment, and decrease in new recruits suggest continued declines in PPD’s filled positions. Using current DROP enrollment, average attrition of employees who are not enrolled in DROP (an average of 214 officers per year from FY 2017 to FY 2022), and average recruit class size of 175 in FY 2019, 2020, and 2022, PPD’s staffing is projected to drop to 5,188 officers by the beginning of FY 2026. This projection assumes that there is no increase in recruiting and retention within PPD, which we recommend should be a priority for the Department:

⁴² PPD’s Crime Prevention and Violence Reduction Plan was released in June 2020. According to the Plan, it is the action plan to realize PPD’s Crime Prevention and Violence Reduction Strategy. The Plan outlines three organizational pillars in support of its goals: Organizational Excellence; Crime Prevention and Violence Reduction; and Community Engagement and Inclusion.

⁴³ “Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan”, *Philadelphia Police Department*, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 36.

⁴⁴ Jad Sleiman, “Philly PD introduces first-ever diversity, equity, and inclusion chief”, *WHYY*, available at <https://whyy.org/articles/philly-pd-introduces-first-ever-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-chief/>.

Projected Uniform Staffing: FY 2023 - FY 2025




The projected trend in uniform staffing is stark, but it is important to note that this potentially lower staffing level is relative to historical officer counts and not the appropriate headcount for Philadelphia’s current population, crime levels, and resident goals for public safety in each district. It also does not take into account whether PPD’s officers are deployed in a manner that effectively serves the needs of Philadelphians and responds to their concerns. Regardless of the overall headcount determination, the current trends in staffing must be addressed. In order to maintain FY 2023 staffing levels through the end of FY 2025, PPD would need to add an average of 466 more recruits per year above the projected recruitment levels, a significant challenge considering the decline in recruitment in recent years. PPD should implement other solutions to its staffing issues, as well. Embracing concepts such as civilianization, community engagement, and co-response can increase PPD’s impact on the community while more effectively utilizing its resources.

Civilianization Impact on Staffing and Personnel Cost

In some cases, PPD uses uniform officers for administrative or non-policing related tasks. As a result, PPD has fewer officers available for deployment to patrol the street. This calls into question the efficiency of PPD’s utilization and deployment of its resources, which is crucial given the staffing decline the department has experienced. One potential solution to increase the number of officers available for deployment is civilianization.

Civilianization refers to the process of identifying positions which do not need to be staffed by uniformed personnel and staffing these positions with civilian employees. Civilianization is not intended to reduce sworn officer headcount, but rather can allow officers to devote their time to tasks which require their expertise. Additionally, equally experienced civilians for a given role or task are typically less expensive than sworn officers.



An analysis of PPD’s staffing levels indicates that civilians comprise only 12% of PPD’s total workforce (as of June 30, 2022). By comparison, a 2016 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that among police departments with 1,000 or more full-time officers, civilians made up 23% of full-time personnel. In departments serving populations greater than 1 million people, civilians made up 25% of full-time personnel.⁴⁵

PPD is aware of the need for civilianization in the department. In its Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Plan issued in June 2020, PPD states it has started a Resource Allocation Program “that allows [PPD] to optimize [its] staffing and deployment.”⁴⁶ The department also indicated it is, “analyzing all support positions in the department to ascertain if any positions can be civilianized. Transitioning some positions from sworn to civilian will enable us to put more police officers on the street to respond to crime.”⁴⁷

As part of its Resource Allocation Program, in 2021 PPD commissioned a study by The University of Pennsylvania Fels Institute of Government on opportunities for civilianization within PPD. Some of the key findings of the report are as follows:


- At PPD’s district stations, a significant amount of administrative work exists which does not require law enforcement powers yet is performed by uniform officers. Outdated systems and processes increase the level of administrative, and in some cases, duplicative, tasks which are performed by uniform officers.
- Some roles within PPD district stations, such as Captain’s Clerks and Civilian Operations Room Assistants, are designed to be performed by civilians but in some cases are currently filled by a sworn officer. These roles could easily be transitioned to civilian positions, which would free up officers to fill positions which require police officer powers.
- PPD should improve several of its practices related to personnel hiring and management, such as creating uniform job descriptions for roles, maintaining more reliable data on its personnel, and creating more opportunities to train civilians in roles that do not require sworn officers. By making these improvements, PPD can not only identify opportunities to civilianize but can create a necessary culture change which welcomes and understands the value of a civilianized workforce.

The civilianization study commissioned by PPD estimated that there are 361 positions that could be most easily transitioned to civilian positions based upon the job requirements and existing

⁴⁵ Shelley S. Hyland, Ph.D., and Elizabeth Davis, “Local Police Departments, 2016: Personnel”, *Bureau of Justice Statistics*, revised January 27, 2021.

⁴⁶ “Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan”, *Philadelphia Police Department*, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 10.


⁴⁷ *Ibid.*



standard operating procedures to staff these positions. However, more positions could be civilianized with the creation of new job descriptions, implementation of specialized training for civilian employees, or adjustment to PPD's organizational structure. According to the report, civilian salaries are on average approximately 20% lower than their sworn equivalent. Importantly, civilianization can also contribute to building trust, transparency, accountability, and legitimacy within communities by improving the community's perspective of the police and enabling the department to become more representative of its community. Civilian roles are also not as restricted by background checks and physical requirements as sworn roles, and those who are employed in civilian roles may then begin to be advocates to their community and for the department while also representing community concerns to the rest of the police department. Civilianization can create cost savings for the department, and free up officers to be used in other capacities, which will help alleviate current deployment challenges cited in the following section.

Recommendations

- **Inventory all current employee roles and responsibilities and develop a job description for each role.** PPD should develop an understanding of the responsibilities of each of its employees. By creating formalized job descriptions, PPD can create consistency in roles and responsibilities throughout the department. This will also allow PPD to better understand the resources needed throughout the various districts and units within the department, as well as what roles must be staffed by sworn personnel, and those that could be considered for civilianization.
- **Implement civilianization program.** PPD has commissioned a review of potential areas within the department that could be civilianized. Using the findings of this report, PPD should civilianize certain roles within the department.
- **Perform an internal assessment of non-DROP attrition.** Using information gathered from exit interviews, PPD should analyze causes of officer attrition and develop tools to increase retention. Also, PPD should assess the level and extent to which surrounding counties are actively soliciting PPD officers and cadets.
- **Review current recruiting requirements.** PPD should analyze the current recruiting requirements it has in place and understand if there are any requirements in place which act as a deterrent to otherwise interested candidates. PPD should explore opportunities to make changes to its eligibility criteria for the police force if the department feels these changes would have a positive impact on recruitment.
- **Identify and analyze potential new recruitment strategies and develop a comprehensive plan to increase PPD's diversity.** PPD should design and implement new recruitment strategies, particularly those focused on attracting female and minority candidates. As recommended in the CRI-TAC study of PPD recruitment, these strategies should be consistent with the current body of research regarding increasing diversity



among police forces⁴⁸ and should be tracked and evaluated in order to identify the most successful messages and avenues for attracting diverse candidates. Additionally, PPD should analyze attrition trends, specifically DROP dates and retirement eligibility, and plan recruitment efforts to correspond with predictable attrition.

- **Enhance data collection and management related to Heart and Lung.** Currently, the data maintained by PPD’s Safety Office and Risk Management related to Heart and Lung usage is limited and disorganized. By improving the accuracy and consistency of the data collected and tracked related to officer injuries and leave usage, including the Heart and Lung benefit, PPD can better identify instances for further investigation to improve its means of detecting instances of abuse of the system.
- **Improve oversight of the Heart and Lung program.** The current system in place for investigation of Heart and Lung cases is convoluted, lacks accountability, and does not appear to be adequate, based on recently documented instances of abuse⁴⁹ of the benefit. With the guidance of the Managing Director and Finance Director, PPD should work with Risk Management to design a process that better identifies instances that require investigation and takes action against officers who are abusing the benefit. This new process should be documented in writing and clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of each entity involved, including Risk Management’s third-party administrator, and formalize partnerships with the Controller’s Office, the Inspector General, and the District Attorney’s Office. By doing so, PPD can discourage future abuse of the benefit.

3. District Deployment


While PPD budgeted for a sworn strength of about 6,500 officers in FY 2022, it has a significant number of vacancies, which resulted in just 6,192 filled uniform positions at the beginning of FY 2022. Of the total uniform officers, approximately 2,500, or about 40%, are assigned to the districts as part of PPD’s Patrol Operations,⁵⁰ with the remaining officers assigned to other units such as the detective or airport divisions, special units such as highway patrol or narcotics, or central PPD. As discussed in the previous section, officer headcounts, including staffing allocations to the districts, are based on historical numbers, not a strategic assessment of the number of officers needed by each district to effectively perform its duties and respond to the needs of the community.

While current new officer classes are insufficient to fill all vacancies across the department, most changes to district deployment occur when graduating police recruits are assigned to a district. District Captains, who lead and oversee the staff and deployment of resources for their district,

⁴⁸ See for example, “More Than Public Service: A Field Experiment on Job Advertisements and Diversity in the Police” by Elizabeth Linos.

⁴⁹ Barbara Laker, David Gambacorta, and William Bender, “MIA: Crisis in the Ranks”, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 1, 2022.

⁵⁰ Includes officers in supervisory roles (such as Lieutenants and Captains), as well as officers who work in administrative positions.



submit vacancy reports that detail the number of officers the district is below its authorized strength. District Captains stated that “vacancies” do not account for officers assigned to that district who are on restricted or no duty. In one instance, a District Captain stated that an officer was on no duty for three years but remained on the roster during that entire period and therefore no vacancy was reported.


The decision of how new officers are assigned is made at the Deputy Commissioner level. Based on interviews with PPD personnel at the Deputy Commissioner level, the assignment of new officers to a district considers several factors, including districts’ specific vacancies and the distribution of violent crime. However, some District Captains expressed confusion about the methodology and decision-making process of assigning new recruits to the districts.

While not a written policy or standard procedure, PPD indicated in interviews with Stout that busier districts that experience higher levels of violent crime and more calls for service will be allocated more new officers than districts with less activity. Once District Captains receive their recruits, they generally have autonomy in deciding how to deploy the officers, with few exceptions,⁵¹ determining a minimum number of officers who must be on duty at a given time within their district. Though they have daily briefings with Deputy Commissioners and Inspectors to discuss recent crime trends within the district and how those trends should impact deployment, District Captains ultimately decide where and how to deploy their officers. Deployment strategies can vary greatly from district to district, as District Captains must consider the number of officers available that day in relation to their minimum patrol requirements, recent crime activity, and the need to focus on hot spots and pinpoint grids⁵² within their district. Required minimum amounts can also vary from district to district, but some District Captains interviewed by Stout indicated that for each shift, they strive to ensure there is at least one car deployed in each police service area and at least one car deployed within each pinpoint grid within the district.

According to District Captains, officers who are out on leave, detailed out to other units or districts, or absent on a given day create a significant resource strain on deployment decisions, often resulting in overtime being used to cover the gap. Although, as noted in the previous section, the overtime coded for absentee replacement remained consistent from FY 2017 to FY 2021 at about \$4 to \$5 million. Large events such as parades and festivals, as well as increases in crime in other districts, can also deplete the resources available to District Captains as officers can be temporarily reassigned at the direction of PPD’s Patrol Operations unit to cover these events. Requests for officers to cover events in other districts come from Inspectors or Deputy Commissioners. Based on interviews with District Captains, these requests sometimes come with little advance notice, and they are unable to decline the request. These challenges can further reduce the number of officers available for patrol in a district at any given time.

⁵¹ For example, the Mayor’s Office has mandated that PPD’s 24th District have a certain level of officer patrol due to the volume of unsheltered individuals within an area of that district. The 24th District includes a sub-station dedicated to the Kensington neighborhood.

⁵² PPD’s Operation Pinpoint is discussed later in this section of this report.



The previous sections of this report discussed staffing trends from FY 2017 to FY 2021 and the number of uniformed officers currently available for duty. This section will examine how many officers are currently assigned to each district and how the deployment decisions in the districts relate to current levels of crime.

Patrol Officer Deployment by District

Though PPD has more than 6,000 uniform officers, only about 2,500 officers are available for patrol, with total officer headcount by district ranging from approximately 70 to 190. The number of available officers on any specific day is further restricted after excluding officers out on IOD, as well as other types of leave such as vacation and sick time. This pool of available officers is then sub-divided to staff three main shifts each day, covering the periods from 8AM to 4PM, 4PM to 12AM, and 12AM to 8AM. From FY 2017 to FY 2022, this led to an average of about 22 patrol officers assigned to the highest crime districts at a particular time, with about 11 patrol officers assigned to the lowest crime districts.⁵³ These deployment totals are presented for each district in the table below, sorted by average deployment in FY 2022 from largest to smallest.

⁵³ Deployment totals in this section are based on officer assignments listed by shift from timesheet data in PPD's Daily Attendance Record (DAR) system. The totals include officers assigned to street patrol in one of the City's 21 districts, as well as district-assigned officers working overtime shifts categorized as "Crime Plan."

**TABLE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF PATROL OFFICERS PER HOUR
BY POLICE DISTRICT, FY 2017 – FY 2022⁵⁴**

Sorted by average deployment FY 2017 - FY 2022, largest to smallest

Police District	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	FY17-FY22 Average
22	20	22	24	24	19	21	22
24	23	22	23	24	18	18	22
12	20	21	23	25	22	19	22
15	24	22	22	22	20	19	21
25	22	21	22	24	20	18	21
19	21	20	21	20	18	15	19
18	20	19	20	20	17	16	19
35	19	19	19	21	17	16	19
14	17	18	18	18	14	14	17
3	17	18	17	17	15	14	16
6	15	15	15	16	16	14	15
17	15	16	16	17	15	13	15
39	16	16	17	15	12	13	15
16	15	16	17	14	14	11	14
2	15	15	16	15	12	12	14
26	15	16	16	15	11	11	14
1	12	12	12	13	11	10	12
9	13	12	12	12	10	10	11
8	12	13	13	11	10	9	11
5	11	11	12	11	10	10	11
7	10	12	11	11	10	10	11

It is worth emphasizing the magnitude of the hourly deployment data discussed in this section and seen in the table above. There are typically about 18 to 21 patrol officers working at any given hour in each of the city’s highest crime districts, such as the 24th District. Districts with lower overall crime rates, such as the 1st, 5th, and 7th Districts, have less than half of that total, averaging about 10 patrol officers in any given hour. With such scarce available patrol resources, it is crucial that PPD conduct a staffing analysis to determine the number of officers needed citywide and at the district level to operate efficiently and meet the needs of the community.

In FY 2021 and FY 2022, average hourly deployment of patrol officers declined across nearly all districts. As discussed previously, PPD’s available pool of officers declined significantly during these years, driven by increases in attrition and IOD usage and declines in recruiting. According to interviews with District Captains, this decline in available patrol officers negatively impacted PPD’s ability to sufficiently staff shifts and address public safety needs across the City’s 21

⁵⁴ Data rounded to the nearest officer.

districts. However, the declines in patrol deployment were not equal across districts. The chart below shows the average hourly patrol deployment per district and division, relative to the deployment level in FY 2017. The East division, which includes the Kensington neighborhood, has experienced the largest overall decline in patrol officer deployment, with FY 2022's total at 78% of its FY 2017 level. On the other hand, hourly patrol deployment in PPD's Central division has experienced the smallest decline, recovering to 92% of its FY 2017 level by FY 2022.


Average Hourly Patrol Deployment, Relative to FY 2017 Levels

District	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022	
Central	6	100%	101%	97%	106%	108%	91%
	9	100%	93%	94%	89%	73%	77%
	22	100%	108%	119%	119%	94%	103%
South	1	100%	100%	96%	108%	88%	79%
	3	100%	107%	104%	103%	88%	81%
	17	100%	107%	107%	116%	101%	89%
East	24	100%	97%	100%	104%	78%	77%
	25	100%	96%	100%	109%	91%	83%
	26	100%	105%	107%	101%	74%	73%
Southwest	12	100%	105%	117%	127%	113%	98%
	16	100%	108%	114%	98%	93%	75%
	18	100%	97%	104%	104%	89%	84%
	19	100%	99%	101%	96%	89%	74%
Northwest	5	100%	100%	105%	101%	91%	87%
	14	100%	105%	105%	102%	83%	80%
	35	100%	99%	98%	111%	90%	82%
	39	100%	101%	107%	95%	77%	84%
Northeast	2	100%	97%	104%	94%	79%	78%
	7	100%	111%	110%	104%	94%	92%
	8	100%	106%	106%	95%	83%	74%
	15	100%	90%	91%	90%	84%	79%

Division	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	FY 2022
Central	100%	102%	105%	107%	93%	92%
South	100%	105%	103%	109%	92%	83%
East	100%	98%	102%	105%	82%	78%
Southwest	100%	102%	108%	107%	96%	83%
Northwest	100%	101%	103%	103%	85%	83%
Northeast	100%	98%	100%	94%	84%	80%

From FY 2017 through FY 2022, Philadelphia’s level of violent crime has undergone significant changes, including a steady increase in gun violence prior to the pandemic followed by an unprecedented increase since 2020. Despite these changes, the average number of patrol officers deployed per hour has remained relatively consistent from year to year. Patrol deployment, which peaks in the evening around 10PM, generally aligns with times of peak gun violence, as measured by the number of shooting victims per hour. One noteworthy exception was FY 2021, which saw a dramatic decline in patrol deployment across all hours of the day relative to previous years, particularly during the period of peak gun violence in the evening. As shown in the left panel of the chart below, patrol deployment has recovered in FY 2022 (purple line) but still remains at about 80% of its FY 2017 level (blue line) at hours of peak deployment in the evening.

Hourly Deployment of Patrol Officers vs. Crime Trends



Sources: PPD Daily Attendance Record & Open Data Philly

District Personnel Spending

Given PPD’s total personnel budget, the distribution of those funds across districts offers additional insight into PPD’s allocation of resources and district deployment strategy. Total personnel spending for district officers⁵⁵ depends on a number of factors, including assigned headcount, leave and overtime usage, and officer experience, but ultimately, it is a direct reflection of PPD resource allocation. Rather than rely on historical trends, these resources should be aligned with the needs of communities today and appropriately scaled across districts to achieve the public safety goals of each district. Crime prevention is one such goal, but there are many others, as discussed in more detail in the final section of this report. While salary and overtime spending for districts should generally correlate with the level of crime in each district, there are many justifiable


⁵⁵ As in previous sections, spending amounts in this section are based on the districts to which officers are assigned, include salaries for officers out on Heart and Lung, and do not account for instances in which an officer may have worked hours in another district.

reasons why this may not be a perfect one-to-one relationship. Foremost among these reasons is the need to tailor public safety strategies to meet the goals of each community.

The chart below shows the relationship between each district’s share of personnel costs in FY 2021 and the historical share of crime incidents occurring in that district. District personnel costs are, in fact, correlated with historical crime trends, meaning that districts with more crime account for a larger share of personnel spending and vice versa. In so much as crime prevention is a primary public safety focus, the data aligns with expectation; however, it is also an indication that PPD may be relying on historical crime trends for district deployment rather than a more responsive approach to district needs.

Some districts did have meaningful departures from proportional allocation, as highlighted in red and blue in the chart below. This is not necessarily an indication of inequitable resource allocation, if district deployment strategies are informed by community needs and feedback. However, the overall trend shown in the chart does raise questions regarding PPD’s deployment strategies in higher crime districts. For example, in the 10 districts with the highest shares of criminal incidents, seven fall below an equal proportion of salary costs to crime. On the other hand, in the 11 districts with the lowest shares of crime, eight of the 11 districts fall above an equal salary proportion. While specific districts can be expected to vary from this proportional allocation, the trend across all districts appears to show a larger misalignment of resources. It is worth noting the trend in the district with the city’s highest share of crime, the 24th District, which includes the Kensington neighborhood. It had the largest discrepancy, falling well below an equal allocation of salary costs given its high crime levels, with a share of crime incidents at 8.0% but only a 5.4% share of salary costs in FY 2021, the 7th most of any district.

Personnel Spending by District Relative to Crime Levels



Note: Salary & OT spending data from FY 2021; Crime share based on the total crime incidents occurring in three fiscal years prior to FY 2021


PPD's Operation Pinpoint

As discussed previously, District Captains are responsible for officer deployment within their district. While planning for how to deploy officers district-wide, District Captains must also consider Operation Pinpoint, PPD's "multifaceted crime fighting and information sharing strategy designed to identify, collect, analyze, and disseminate information that officers, and commanders need to target the worst violent offenders and areas."⁵⁶ Operation Pinpoint is a key part of PPD's Violent Crime Response Strategy, which employs multiple policing models, strategies, and tactics in an effort to reduce and prevent gun violence.⁵⁷ It is also part of PPD's strategy to support the City of Philadelphia's anti-violence plan, The Roadmap to Safer Communities.

Launched as a pilot program in January 2019, Operation Pinpoint combines intelligence-based and community-oriented policing models, focusing resources and deploying certain policing methods and tactics in hot spot areas, called grids. Grids may be different sizes, have different types of most prevalent crimes, and have different environmental factors that contribute to their public safety challenges and community concerns. PPD identifies the worst offenders within each grid using data consolidated from multiple sources, including historical gang information, stop data, and social network analysis.⁵⁸ Using this information, District Captains are responsible for developing plans to reduce crime within the pinpoint zones in their district, and for making deployment decisions in support of their plan. District Captains must also develop weekly plans for their pinpoint grids. Based on interviews with District Captains, they are provided data by crime analysts, in conjunction with qualitative feedback and other information, to help inform the grid plan they develop to address the issues within the pinpoint grids in their districts.

Operation Pinpoint was expanded from seven grids at its launch to 45 grids throughout 2020 after it was approved for citywide implementation. As shown in the map to the right, there is at least one pinpoint grid in each police district.


Police Service Areas (PSAs) & Operation Pinpoint Grids



⁵⁶ "Operation Pinpoint", Philadelphia Police Department, available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kTZ_7FVc-Z4lorb4eehHLYCqk3vimD2Y/view.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ "Data Driven Efforts to Combat Gun Violence: A Discussion on Civil Liberty Protections", Philadelphia Police Department, available at <https://www.phila.gov/media/20200630153839/PAC-GVI-Report.pdf>, p. 17.




Based on interviews with PPD, the decision to expand Operation Pinpoint dramatically and rapidly may have greatly impaired PPD’s ability to both effectively implement Operation Pinpoint and complete a robust evaluation of Operation Pinpoint and its component grid strategies. Specifically, Operation Pinpoint’s approach may represent a significant change to policing strategies relative to what many District Captains and other officers may have experienced over the duration of their law enforcement careers. The effective implementation of such strategies can often require deliberate efforts to develop a shared commitment among those who are responsible for developing and leading the customized strategies in each grid. Without this shared commitment among the District Captains, the implementation in certain grids may be incomplete or ineffective. PPD itself noted that Operation Pinpoint’s success at reducing violence was dependent on its consistent implementation.⁵⁹ Moreover, the commitment to the strategy must be held by the officers themselves, as they play a pivotal role in gathering and using the pinpoint intelligence, as well as implementing the prescribed tactics appropriately while on patrol.

To our knowledge, a formal, independent evaluation of Operation Pinpoint has not been conducted, nor has PPD provided Stout with any evaluations of Operation Pinpoint or indicated that one is underway. Independent evaluations, particularly of new or innovative interventions or strategies, are critical means of assessing impact, outcomes, and effectiveness. If a data tracking strategy were in place to allow for Operation Pinpoint to be credibly evaluated, Philadelphians could be informed about whether this program, or aspects of this program, are improving public safety, how it is responding to the needs of community, and whether there are observable unintended or unexpected consequences or community impacts that can be resolved through programmatic and strategic revisions or adaptations.

Additionally, while PPD has invested in database administration and data analytics support to assist in the development of customized pinpoint zone strategies, as well as analysts that can assist with the review and interpretation of the data, it does not appear that PPD developed a cohesive and comprehensive data strategy for the expansion of Operation Pinpoint. For example, crime analysts develop weekly Grid Report Cards that track time spent by officers within the grid (broken out further by time spent responding to 911 calls and “available” time), amount of crime in the grid (broken out by crime type), number of intelligence reports compiled on individuals of interest within the grid, number of arrests and stops, and amount of environmental risk reduction completed (e.g., removal of abandoned vehicles, removal of graffiti, illegal dumping addressed, lights fixed, vacant lot/building cleaned, etc.) compared to the prior month and the prior year. During interviews with PPD, Stout was shown a sample Grid Report Card. Based on the information presented on the card, it is unclear how this information would provide useful insight to District Captains in adjusting the weekly plan for their pinpoint areas. Particularly, the card does not contain any information about officer deployment in relation to the crime/activity or intelligence reports generated, and to our knowledge, the discussions of Grid Report Cards do not

⁵⁹ “Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan”, *Philadelphia Police Department*, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 8.



result in direct communication with other departments that support environmental risk reduction efforts.

Operation Pinpoint was intended to combine policing tactics and methods to address the specific public safety needs of the grid and to collect the data necessary for informing its operational model. PPD explained some of the tactics and methods used as part of Operation Pinpoint, including expanded foot patrols, effective mere encounters (low-level interactions between an officer and a civilian, where there is no obligation for the civilian to stop or to answer any of the officer's questions), hot-spot policing (the focused policing of areas where crimes are clustered), and problem-oriented policing (investigating and developing a targeted response to the specific problem(s) that are increasing crime risks). Challenges relating to the implementation of some of these tactics are discussed further below.

Foot Patrol


In 2009, PPD, in collaboration with Temple University's Department of Criminal Justice, completed a foot patrol experiment, which involved more than 200 police officers patrolling some of Philadelphia's most violent corners.⁶⁰ As a result of the activities undertaken in this experiment, violent crime decreased 23% in the targeted areas relative to the comparison areas after three months. The target areas also saw a 15% increase in drug-related incident detections, a 64% increase in pedestrian stops, a 7% increase in vehicle stops, and a 13% increase in arrests. The study estimated that even when accounting for crime displacement, the foot patrols prevented 53 violent crimes during the summer in which the study took place.⁶¹

Inconsistent with PPD's definition of Operation Pinpoint, and despite knowing that foot patrols work in Philadelphia as a means to decrease violent crime and increase arrests, it appears that foot patrols are not consistently a primary focus of PPD's deployment strategies. Some District Captains indicated that they have a dedicated foot patrol in their district, often comprised of newer, less experienced officers. Others indicated that current staffing limitations, or the size of the areas to which their officers are assigned, a dedicated foot patrol is not possible or practical. Further, when District Captains face resource shortages due to officers on leave, calling out of work, or being detailed out of the district, they often prioritize having officers in patrol cars to better respond to 911 calls.

According to interviews with PPD District Captains, some districts, despite not having a dedicated foot beat, deploy officers on bicycles, and encourage officers in patrol cars to park and walk around the neighborhood when they are not responding to calls. Several

⁶⁰ Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Travis Taniguchi, Elizabeth R. Groff, and Jennifer D. Wood, "The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots", 2011, available at <https://blueravenintelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/blue-raven-intelligence-foot-patrol.pdf>.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*



District Captains interviewed indicated that staffing shortages make it difficult for officers to spend time walking around while they are deployed, because those officers need to be available to respond to 911 calls, potentially a significant distance from where they are stationed. PPD collects data in pinpoint grids regarding the average time officers spend responding to 911 calls and when they are available by both the District Line Squad and the District Special Units. This information, coupled with 911 data (which will be discussed in the next section of the report) could be analyzed and used to help determine how to effectively balance the need for foot patrols and the need for officers to be available to respond to 911 calls.


Mere Encounters

PPD defines mere encounters as “A consensual interaction where the officer may ask the citizen questions and generally engage the citizen in conversation. In this interaction, the police officer may ask for identification from the citizen, but the citizen is under no obligation to engage the officer or provide identification. Refusal to comply with requests and conversations does not provide the officer with any additional suspicion.”⁶² However, without effective oversight, data collection, training, and community feedback this definition leaves open the possibility that officers could perform a “mere encounter” (by this definition), but do so in a way that is accusatory, confrontational or creates an escalation that causes harm and could be interpreted to be largely analogous to a stop and frisk encounter. This further emphasizes the need for consistent, comprehensive feedback from the community that can be analyzed and compared to data collected by PPD – to identify when the feedback from the community is inconsistent or incongruent with the data collected by PPD. PPD is currently piloting a program to document mere encounters, however the current data being collected is minimal, and insufficient to effectuate strategic decisions. A successful mere encounter can both build a community’s trust in the police force and aid the department in completing investigations and improving the community’s overall safety.

Hot Spot Policing

While some police departments have found hot-spot policing strategies useful, it is often considered by people in the community, as well as certain members of the policing community, as a strategy that can lead to disparate burdens on communities of color. When done improperly, officers might engage in indiscriminate aggressive tactics and the small decrease in crimes may destabilize areas as more low-income minority people are taken into the criminal justice system. As such, the implementation of hot-spot policing strategies

⁶² Police Advisory Commission, *Executive Review of the Philadelphia Police Department’s Pedestrian Investigations*, November 2020 - <https://www.phila.gov/media/20210125110505/PAC-Stop-and-Frisk-recommendations-with-PPD-Response.pdf>




should be done in coordination with continual, measurable feedback from the community and concrete measures to prevent misuse and over-reach.

A police department should understand what the community indicates it needs to improve safety, develop targeted strategies aligned with those communicated needs, and track and report on that progress for public accountability. This approach should be incorporated at every level of the department, be it the academy, the hiring process, officer training and daily officer and civilian personnel activities.

Recommendations

- **Strategically evaluate the range of acceptable staffing necessary to meet community needs within PPD districts:** PPD's deployment strategy is not currently based on a predetermined number of officers necessary to adequately respond to the needs of the communities it serves, but rather on historical headcount and resource allocation practices. PPD should evaluate the needs of the communities it serves and determine the number of officers necessary at a given time to respond to those needs. In developing this analysis PPD should consider the range of acceptable staffing based on the specific strategies necessary in each District. At one end of this range would be the minimum number of officers required to adequately respond to community needs based on the strategies that are being used. At the other end of the range would be the maximum number that may be required without harming the community. PPD should develop continual monitoring systems to ensure staffing in each District is within this range. Such an evaluation can help PPD ensure that its districts are staffed in the most appropriate manner necessary to provide safety and support to the people of Philadelphia and can help inform PPD's overall budget and resource allocation strategy, as discussed above in **PPD BUDGET AND SPENDING**.
- **Develop a comprehensive data strategy for Operation Pinpoint.** Using the additional information described above, PPD should develop a comprehensive strategy (and related tools) to use that information for daily deployment decisions, proactive and preventative response strategies, opportunities for internal and external engagement, public data sharing and transparency, etc. This strategy should be centered on achieving the needs for community and building trust, legitimacy, and credibility with the community. Doing so will require transparency regarding the data collection, analysis, observations, and results of the strategies developed.
- **Perform a comprehensive evaluation of Operation Pinpoint.** While the data collected by PPD for Operation Pinpoint currently has significant limitations, an independent evaluation of Operation Pinpoint will assist in developing a comprehensive understanding of the additional data collection needs while also assessing where improvement can be made in the shared commitment among District Captains. The evaluation should be conducted by a qualified, independent party and should be shared publicly when completed.

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- **Ensure District Captains are engaged in the effective development and implementation of pinpoint grid strategies.** Operation Pinpoint will not be successful unless District Captains embrace the strategic use of the policing strategies and community engagement that Operation Pinpoint is intended to have. PPD should ensure that District Captains receive regular training and are subject to regular review from superiors regarding their review and use of available data, the development of policing strategies that respond to the needs of community, their commitment to the needs of community and their use of feedback directly from the community, the use of strategies that minimize police officer presence when possible, and their commitment to continual learning from the data and qualitative feedback and the adaptation of their strategies to those insights. When possible, District Captains should be encouraged to share successes and challenges in productive, collaborative settings designed to create a shared purpose regarding the implementation of effective policing strategies in Operation Pinpoint.
 - **Collect data that will inform PPD deployment strategies.** PPD's Statistics Unit should continue to collect data related to the new methods of policing being considered and / or implemented by PPD. Data that can be collected from officer cell phones (which have recently been provided to all officers), data from mere encounters, data from patrol car GPS, data from community surveys and other feedback, 911 data and other data related to community needs, data from co-responder activities (see the **COMMUNITY LEGITIMACY** section below), etc. would all be valuable to strategically incorporate in analysis and data visualization that can inform daily deployment and resource allocations / needs.
 - **Develop metrics and data collection for mere encounters.** Mere encounters are the least intensive level of interaction between an officer and a civilian, where there is no obligation for the civilian to stop or to answer any of the officer's questions (e.g., an officer engaging in a non-coercive conversation with a member of the community while walking on the street). PPD is currently piloting a program to document mere encounters, however the current data being collected is minimal, and insufficient to effectuate strategic decisions. We recommend that mere encounters be thoroughly and consistently documented and independently reviewed/assessed to ensure accuracy (including, but not limited to, through the review of body-worn camera footage).
 - **Ensure officers are trained on how to conduct mere encounters.** PPD should ensure all officers are trained on how to conduct effective mere encounters, what PPD's expectations are for mere encounters, and what data should be collected for each mere encounter. Furthermore, PPD should integrate community feedback into the regular and consistent monitoring of mere encounters to ensure mere encounters are effective and not used improperly as a form of stop intended to escalate to a confrontation. A successful mere encounter will both build a community's trust in the police force and aid the department in completing investigations and improving the community's overall safety. PPD should incentivize its officers to perform effective mere encounters frequently during their patrol shifts.


4. 911 Response

A swift and equitable strategy to respond to 911 calls is critical to ensuring public safety while also boosting community trust in a police department and avoiding an overburdened department. Mortality rates increase significantly when the response time for a 911 call is over five minutes,⁶³ for example, and research indicates that the community’s opinion of police quality is affected by their response time.⁶⁴ Ultimately, investing in enhancements to 911 call response strategies can increase the department’s legitimacy in the community, and the data collected from those calls can be used to better allocate department resources by separating calls in which an immediate police response is required from those better suited for other agencies and first responders.

Time to Answer 911 Calls

The City’s 911 response system begins with a set of dispatchers in the Communication Services Bureau tasked with answering incoming calls. Dispatchers seek to answer 911 calls within 10 seconds, in accordance with standards established by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. However, as seen in the chart below, the response time has been below this desired benchmark since 2018. There was a further decrease in 2021 when only 68% of 911 calls were answered within 10 seconds. The average response time has improved in the first quarter of calendar year 2022, although it remains below the 90% benchmark.


Percent of 911 Calls Answered Within 10 Seconds



Source: Daily wait time range per call category reports produced for PPD by Vesta Analytics

⁶³ Rebecca Neusteter, Maris Mapolski, Mawia Khogali, and Megan O’Toole, “The 911 Call Processing System: A Review of the Literature as it Relates to Policing.” New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2019, p. 21.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 25.



As response times declined in 2021, an increasing number of calls took a significant amount of time to be answered. PPD took over one minute to answer about 101,000 (4.1%) of the 2.4 million total 911 calls received in 2021. About 6,500 (0.3%) of these calls were not answered within two minutes.⁶⁵ In 2019, the last full year prior to the pandemic, only about 13,000 (0.55%) calls were not answered within a minute, and the wait times for only 449 (0.02%) callers exceeded two minutes. Additionally, it is important to note that this data only captures calls that were answered. If a caller hung up or a call was not answered at all, it would not be included in these numbers.

According to PPD, the downturn in 2021 was at least partially attributable to the staffing limitations prompted by the pandemic, particularly from dispatchers calling out sick. However, response times began declining several years prior to 2021, although these declines were less significant than the 2021 decrease. If increased leave usage during the pandemic presented a challenge, it was further complicated by dispatcher vacancies. PPD's FY 2021 budget included \$12.3 million for 278 Communications Dispatchers and trainees, although the number of filled positions ranged from 230 to 255 throughout the year.


Citywide Response Time

Once a call is received, PPD dispatches officers to respond based on a priority system ranging from 1 (highest priority) to 6 (lowest priority). Priority 1 events consist of emergencies such as an individual with a weapon, burglary in progress, and other in-progress events. Examples of some of the most common lower priority events include: domestic incidents and car accidents with injuries (Priority 2); burglary alarms and car accidents without injuries (Priority 3); illegal parking and loud music complaints (Priority 4); premise and car investigations (Priority 5); and reports of thefts and vandalism (Priority 6).

The chart below shows PPD's call to dispatch response time for 911 calls received during calendar year 2021. The call to dispatch time measures how long calls sit "pending", corresponding to the time between when the call is first received to when it is assigned to an available officer to respond. The call to dispatch time for Priority 1 events, which made up 13% of total call volume, was 3 minutes and 10 seconds. This is significantly faster than the call to dispatch times for lower priority codes. For example, response times for Priority 2, 3, and 4 events, which made up 59% of the total call volume, were longer than 29 minutes. Priority 5 codes depicted in the chart include numerous dispatch codes for self-initiated assignments (e.g., an officer calling in a car stop), codes that get assigned to other departments (e.g., 311 or Fire Department), and 911 hang ups. These types of events are recorded as a response time of 0:00, resulting in a significantly shorter average response time for Priority 5 than other lower-priority codes.

⁶⁵ ">=121 Seconds" is the wait time classification reported on PPD's Calls by Wait Time report.

911 Call Volume and Dispatch Response Time by Priority Code, Calendar Year 2021



Source: PPD report entitled MIS police response times by priority


To place these response times in context, Stout conducted a review of publicly available 911 response times for large police departments in other municipalities. As public reporting standards vary across jurisdictions, the most easily comparable metric is the total response time for each department’s highest priority event type. While the definitions of “highest priority” can vary from city to city, this comparison still provides insight into the speed with which each department responds to events it considers to be true emergencies. Note that the total response time differs from the call to dispatch time discussed previously, as the total response time also includes the time it takes the dispatched officer to arrive on scene. For example, in Philadelphia the total response time for Priority 1 events was more than 8 minutes in 2021, while the call to dispatch time was 3 minutes and 10 seconds.

PPD’s total response time for its highest priority level events compared to other large police departments⁶⁶ which have recently reported response time data is shown in the chart below.⁶⁷ At more than 8 minutes long, Philadelphia had the longest total response time for the highest priority events of any of the five departments examined.

⁶⁶ As stated above, many departments either do not publicly report their 911 response time or have not in recent years. Departments selected as comparisons to Philadelphia are the four largest police departments which have reported 911 response times in any of the past three fiscal years.

⁶⁷ Data is based on the most recently reported information available for each jurisdiction: calendar year 2021 for Philadelphia, FY 2020 for New York, Houston, and Miami, and FY 2019 for San Francisco.

Average Total Response Time to Highest Priority Events



Source: Review of publicly reported 911 responses times

Response Times by District


Response times for 911 calls are the result of a complex dependency of factors, such as deployment strategies, staffing levels, district size, and overall number of crime incidents. To further understand how PPD allocates its resources across the city, and the corresponding impact on its 911 response performance, this section examines 911 response times by police district.

While citywide dispatch response times averaged about 3 minutes for Priority 1 events and about 30 minutes for Priority 2-4 events in 2021, there was significant variation across the City's 21 police districts. For example, for lower priority events (Priorities 2-4 and 6), the best-performing districts had average response times of about 20 minutes or less, while the worst-performing districts averaged about 60 minutes. For Priority 1 events, dispatch responses times were more than twice as fast in the best-performing districts relative to the slowest districts, with times ranging from about 90 seconds to about 4 minutes. The trends across districts are shown in the series of maps on the following page.

The districts that experienced the longest dispatch times consistently across all priority events are concentrated in the city's Black and Brown communities. These districts are highlighted blue in the maps below. The majority-Hispanic 25th District had an average dispatch response of 3.5 minutes for Priority 1 events (the second-longest of any district) and times ranging from 43 minutes to 82 minutes for lower priority events. Similarly, the majority-Black 35th District had a response time of 2 minutes and 45 seconds for Priority 1 events (the sixth longest) and times ranging from 59 minutes to 77 minutes for lower priority events. The majority-Black 12th and 19th Districts in West Philadelphia also experienced similarly long call to dispatch times, significantly longer than response times in majority-white districts. In addition to these highlighted districts, the 2nd District had the longest dispatch response time for Priority 1 events — this district is 29% Black and 24% Hispanic.

Call to Dispatch Response Time by Priority and District for 2021 911 Calls

Majority-minority districts with slow response times across all priorities are highlighted in blue




The relationship between dispatch response time and resident demographics is further illustrated in the chart below, which shows the average call to dispatch time for all calls relative to the percentage of white residents making up each police district. The data shows a clear trend: districts with more white residents received faster response times overall, with the districts with the most white residents experiencing dispatch response times more than twice as fast as those districts with majority Black and Brown Philadelphians.

The response data discussed in this section indicates that PPD's 911 response strategy is inequitable. For city residents, how quickly PPD will be able to respond to a 911 call depends upon where in the city they live, with longer times disproportionately affecting Black and Brown Philadelphians. Data related to 911 calls provides a powerful opportunity to re-examine the structural forces leading to this inequity and ensure equal public safety outcomes for all Philadelphians.

Response Time vs. Resident Demographics by Police District for All 911 Calls

Majority-minority districts with the longest response times are shown in blue



Source: PPD report entitled MIS police response times by event type for calls in calendar year 2021

While the previous chart shows data for all 911 calls regardless of priority type, the overall trend is consistent across all priorities, as seen in the table below. For each of the six priority types, the majority-Black 12th, 19th, and 35th Districts, as well as the majority-Hispanic 25th District, consistently have longer call to dispatch response times than response times in majority-white districts.

TABLE 3: 911 RESPONSE TIMES VS. DEMOGRAPHICS BY DISTRICT, CY 2021*Sorted by response time for all calls (Priority 1-6), from fastest to slowest*


Police District	Average Call To Dispatch Response Time by Priority in Minutes							Resident Demographics, as a Percent of Total			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	1 - 6	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian
22	01:52	19:45	21:59	19:27	11:03	22:35	12:59	21%	64%	6%	5%
5	01:39	16:05	15:29	22:52	15:19	24:58	13:18	75%	10%	5%	4%
1	01:39	19:01	19:05	21:44	19:45	36:47	13:36	53%	22%	6%	15%
7	01:43	16:14	14:53	20:19	18:12	23:46	14:10	63%	8%	7%	17%
17	01:39	21:59	20:52	26:07	15:19	32:02	16:11	45%	34%	7%	9%
6	01:57	20:39	21:07	25:32	21:01	33:45	16:22	59%	14%	7%	15%
18	01:34	24:58	25:12	27:49	22:56	31:53	16:28	26%	51%	5%	12%
9	01:54	21:31	22:08	27:17	23:24	28:41	17:47	71%	8%	6%	11%
8	02:11	25:57	21:24	29:17	23:42	30:55	19:08	66%	14%	11%	6%
3	02:03	26:18	26:35	31:08	27:40	42:46	19:44	59%	7%	13%	17%
26	02:14	31:32	32:50	36:06	22:57	42:16	20:42	51%	15%	23%	6%
15	02:54	32:03	25:19	23:08	20:39	27:36	20:48	34%	26%	28%	7%
39	02:35	40:17	38:04	47:57	31:00	51:52	23:18	17%	71%	5%	2%
14	02:14	39:48	33:38	37:17	33:49	49:39	25:32	18%	72%	4%	1%
24	03:05	37:59	46:36	53:26	38:27	71:20	26:32	31%	15%	47%	4%
16	02:14	38:09	46:14	44:13	30:44	54:08	27:22	22%	60%	5%	9%
2	04:01	39:57	34:21	33:22	27:43	34:04	27:34	26%	29%	24%	15%
12	02:17	45:35	45:09	46:15	32:51	65:40	29:26	6%	81%	4%	5%
19	02:45	47:08	48:33	55:03	37:32	71:25	31:38	9%	81%	3%	2%
25	03:30	48:32	55:45	55:04	43:30	79:42	33:37	4%	27%	65%	2%
35	02:46	62:15	58:39	58:11	59:51	76:12	40:07	4%	71%	14%	8%

911 Data Analytics

Data related to 911 calls offers PPD a powerful opportunity for self-improvement. An analysis of 911 data paired with informed objectives can increase the speed with which 911 calls are responded to while decreasing crime. For example, properly captured emergency call data can be used to identify hot spots of criminal activity,⁶⁸ which can then inform how to invest resources, such as managing the capacity of a call center during times where call volume is predictably high.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Processing System: A Review of the Literature as it Relates to Policing.” New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2019, p.27.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 28.



PPD has utilized a third-party, Vesta Analytics, for data management related to all calls through the 911 system since 2017. PPD receives reports from Vesta detailing call count, type, and wait time range, on a daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly basis. PPD's primary usage of reports furnished by Vesta is to analyze the wait time range for 911 callers, and to assess the department's compliance with the state-mandated benchmark to answer 90% of 911 calls within 10 seconds. It does not appear that PPD uses 911 call data strategically to identify patterns or insights which can inform the department's overall policing strategy or to address inequities in response time across police districts.

911 call data is a valuable source of information about the community's activity and can be used to identify reasons for police calls and the locations of calls. The collection and analysis of 911 data may reveal insights to inform a policing approach centered on responding to, and possibly providing advance notice of needs in the community. For example, a 2021 study from Temple University's Department of Criminal Justice found that medical or public-health calls for service occur most commonly within two of Philadelphia's neighborhoods, during the late afternoon or evening.⁷⁰


Identifying instances in which police response is not necessary is crucial, both to improve public safety outcomes for residents and to maximize limited police resources. Non-police and non-officer response can prevent escalation of certain situations as well as free up officers to respond to situations where their expertise is necessary. PPD indicated that it re-routes approximately 60 non-emergency calls per month which require city services to 311. The identification of non-emergency calls appears to be underutilized, given that PPD received about 2.4 million calls in 2021 for an average of about 200,000 calls per month.

Additionally, while the City of Philadelphia does not have a 411 line for mental health issues, PPD has a mental health delegate in the 911 radio room every day during the day shift and from 3 pm to 11 pm who assists with calls as needed. PPD also transfers suicidal calls to a crisis hotline. Redirecting other non-emergency calls, such as complaints of a barking dog or vandalism, to other City agencies can help to alleviate the demands on officers and increase PPD's response time to higher-priority incidents that require a true emergency response.

Recommendations

- **Assess the current 911 technology and processes in use and consider an external assessment of 911 data systems and data collection processes.** This will help ensure that PPD is using state-of-the art technology to field calls, collect and analyze information, and enable transparency and collaboration with the public.

⁷⁰ Jerry H. Ratcliffe, "Policing and public health calls for service in Philadelphia", BMC, 2021, *available at* https://www.jratcliffe.net/_files/ugd/f5df24_dbf0ec0564d4489db3d1505536b5c3bf.pdf.

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- **Conduct ongoing assessments of 911 response times to ensure equitable response times across districts and identify opportunities for improvement.** PPD should analyze its 911 response at the district level to understand the factors that create inefficiencies and slow response times. In conjunction with the deployment of resources, this analysis can identify potential solutions to improve response times and eliminate inequities that exist across districts.
 - **Conduct a thorough analysis of 911 and dispatched call data through robust and interactive data visualizations.** This can include:
 - Analyzing call data to identify both city-wide needs as well as needs that are emerging or community specific.
 - Integrating 911 data with other call center data (such as 311) for a better understanding of how community needs correlate with 911 calls.
 - Examining staffing and related costs for 911 dispatchers through tracking trends regarding call volumes, issue type, and other relevant metrics by hour, day of the week, holidays, and upcoming events.
 - PPD is currently using daily and weekly analytics to attempt to optimize staffing and resource allocation within 911. Expanding this through the use of more enhanced and dynamic analytics and visualizations will better enable 911 to identify trends over time and emerging issues.
 - Integrating call data with other data collected by the police department and relevant agencies, allowing for the analysis of comprehensive data to inform policing strategies and resource allocations.
 - **Integrate 911 call data into a comprehensive strategy for bolstering community supports that meet the needs of the community.** 911 call data, coupled with community feedback, presents an important opportunity for understanding community needs and the corresponding non-police agencies, departments, and programs that could be deployed to meet those needs. These non-police services could include unarmed responders, mental health response, opioid response, homeless services, or environmental factor mitigation response. Ensuring other agencies, departments, and programs can respond to these community needs reduces the necessity for police to respond, allowing officers to focus on policing.

5. PPD Systems and Processes

Stout identified several examples of outdated systems and processes that impact PPD's operational efficiency. These inefficiencies create unnecessary or avoidable tasks, put further strain on PPD personnel requirements, and, in some instances, create barriers to PPD collecting data that can be used to inform the development of effective policing strategies that meet the needs of the community. In many cases, there are alternative systems and processes that could be implemented. While Stout did not conduct a comprehensive review of PPD's use of technology or operating systems, the issues discussed in the following section should be noted.


In June 2020, PPD released its Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Plan in response to Mayor James F. Kenney's "call to action" for senior leadership in his administration to develop a plan to reduce rising homicides and gun violence in the city.⁷¹ The plan describes the three organizational pillars on which PPD will focus all of its efforts: Organizational Excellence; Crime Prevention and Violence Reduction; and Community Engagement and Inclusion. Within the Organizational Excellence section of its plan, PPD included certain initiatives like: "Modernize Paper Processes," "Technology Inventory," and "Internal Communication Plan for PPD Personnel to Improve Information Sharing and Transparency."

PPD personnel interviewed by Stout were aware of the issues and limitations cited in this section, however Stout did not observe any tangible improvements to outdated processes. Despite this and these initiatives being included in the Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Plan, none of these three initiatives have been completed in the two years since the plan was issued. Moreover, Stout observed little to no improvement in these areas during this engagement.

Physical Documentation and Delivery of Mail

During several interviews with PPD personnel, the existence of paper documentation and physical delivery of such documentation was cited as an opportunity for modernization within the department. A significant amount of information is communicated throughout the department using inter-office envelopes containing physical documents. There are very few, if any, instances in which email should not be the primary method of communication throughout the department. For example, the department-wide training bulletins, which are currently printed out and physically distributed throughout the department, where they are signed by officers and filed away. Even if the department were to use email to communicate information to commanding officers of its units and districts, and then allow those commanding officers to disseminate information in a manner of their choosing (i.e., continuing to print and distribute physical documents), PPD could add efficiency to its current processes.

⁷¹ "Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan", *Philadelphia Police Department*, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 3.



In many cases, physical paper documents are delivered across districts and units by uniformed personnel. This practice is inefficient and wasteful of both physical resources and labor. Additionally, the sworn officers that deliver these documents are not only more expensive than civilians, but this activity reduces the amount of time that these officers are spending out in the community doing more substantive police work.


The teletype is another example of an outdated physical process still in use by PPD. Each day, an individual from the HR department must create the teletype, a memorandum that is electronically disseminated to all districts to be printed and read at the following day's roll call. Information for the teletype, including directive updates and personnel information like new appointments, separations, and promotions as well as individuals on leave, is provided to the HR department daily by the Safety Office. Based on interviews with PPD HR, it is estimated that creating the teletype takes approximately two hours of an employee's time every day. This task is redundant and inefficient, as the Safety Office information which is received by HR could easily be emailed to all districts to be read at roll call.

Human Resources Systems and Processes

There are several processes and systems in place within PPD's Human Resources department that are outdated, inefficient, or in need of improvement. Examples of areas for improvement specific to HR are as follows:

- **Personnel data management:** PPD human resources data is maintained across disparate sources, including:
 - PPD's personnel database, which details all current PPD personnel.
 - Physical personnel files on index cards, which detail the complete employment history for all past and present PPD personnel.
 - A Microsoft Access Database, which the HR department uses to track separations, appointments, and discipline.
 - A Microsoft Excel file, through which HR manually tracks vacancies.
 - OnePhilly, the City's payroll system that the details PPD personnel data since 2019.

PPD's personnel database includes all details about current employees of the department. This database reflects current PPD staffing, and is overwritten as changes to personnel, such as promotions or transfers, occur, and therefore does not capture historical personnel data. HR also maintains a physical personnel file for every PPD employee, which captures the individual's complete employment history. For example, if an employee has worked for PPD for 10 years, has received promotions, and has switched districts several times, the personnel database will reflect their current level and assignment within the department. Their prior assignments, dates of transfer between districts, and dates of promotion over the course of their employment will be contained only in their physical personnel file.



Since 2019, historical HR data for PPD personnel has also been maintained within OnePhilly. The employment history for any PPD employee who separated from the department prior to the launch of OnePhilly is only available on the physical index cards maintained by PPD Human Resources. Additionally, PPD has continued to maintain physical index cards for all employees since the launch of OnePhilly.

The use of these disparate systems to track the same type of information, as well as the reliance of different manual processes, is inefficient.

- **Lack of job descriptions and defined roles and responsibilities.** Other than general descriptions in each rank's civil service description, PPD does not have documented or standardized job descriptions that define the roles and responsibilities for specific job functions which exist at the district level (e.g., Administrative Sergeant, Reports Officer, etc.) held by its personnel. Without consistent, agreed-upon and documented job descriptions, it is difficult to measure performance and make data driven decisions regarding the allocation of resources and capabilities. It also allows supervisors latitude to make individual decisions as to the roles and responsibilities for a position, which creates additional challenges, including but not limited to impacting PPD's ability to determine whether a role is better fit for a civilian.

PPD's Payroll Process and Failure to Integrate OnePhilly

PPD does not use Oracle Time and Labor (OTL), OnePhilly's timekeeping system, for daily time entry. Rather, PPD continues to utilize the legacy Daily Attendance Report (DAR) system to track employees' time, which creates the following timekeeping processes for sworn and civilian personnel:

- **Sworn Personnel:** OTL assumes that sworn personnel work their full minimum scheduled hours in each pay period and generates "Assumed Time" for these employees. PPD Finance personnel receive a daily "Exception Report" from DAR, which indicates instances in which an individual did not work the time they were scheduled to work (e.g., individuals who were sick, individuals who are on leave, etc.) Payroll clerks record all exceptions onto index cards, and then enter the exceptions in OTL to appropriately update the individual's time. The use of Assumed Time and the associated need to record exceptions, creates additional work for PPD Finance, creates the potential for human error, and can also lead to inaccuracies in payroll data for any unrecorded exceptions.
- **Civilian Personnel:** Civilians record their time onto physical timesheets, after which point PPD Finance inputs the timesheet information into DAR, hand-writes the timesheet hours onto an Employee Attendance Record (EAR) sheet for each employee and enters the timesheet data into OTL from the EAR sheet. The civilian payroll process is extremely manual, includes redundancies in which the same data is recorded multiple times in

different systems or on physical documents, and wastes Finance resources by utilizing multiple payroll clerks to perform a basic task.

The examples above put a strain on PPD's resources and limit its ability to manage personnel data for strategic decision making.

Many PPD personnel interviewed by Stout recognized the menial and redundant nature of certain tasks and outdated technology/processes. However, when asked what additional resources they need to perform their tasks better, almost all units asked for additional staff. Few, if any, stated that improving or modernizing the process as a solution. PPD has opportunities to improve several systems and processes which are currently in place. Modernization, or in some cases, elimination, of these systems and processes would enhance the effectiveness of the department's operations in ways such as improving the accessibility and reliability of data throughout PPD, reducing the amount of time spent on inefficient or redundant administrative tasks, and enabling PPD to better allocate its resources in ways that respond to the needs of the community.

Recommendations

- **Complete the “Technology Inventory” identified in the Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Plan.** Based on the findings of the Technology Inventory, which is intended to “[a]ssess and understand systems being operated at PPD” and [i]dentify additional technology and upgrades needed”,⁷² create a plan for the implementation of new systems that will improve the reliability and accessibility of data throughout the police department.
- **Eliminate unnecessary paper processes.** There are many opportunities for PPD to communicate information electronically, which would lead to cost savings and decrease the amount of time spent by sworn personnel on unnecessary administrative tasks.
- **Build a comprehensive personnel database and management system.** PPD's current ability to track historical information related to its personnel is extremely limited. By implementing a more robust personnel database and management system, PPD can better understand the changes that occur to its workforce, and how those changes impact the effectiveness of the department. A better understanding of its staffing needs can allow PPD to make more informed decisions and identify roles, programs, and units in need of enhancement.
- **Fully integrate with OnePhilly for timekeeping and payroll purposes.** A complete adoption of OnePhilly will centralize PPD personnel and payroll data, as well as eliminate redundancies that currently exist in PPD payroll process. In the absence of full integration, both PPD and the OnePhilly unit within the City's Office of the Director of Finance should provide a report explaining why this cannot be accomplished.

⁷² “Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan”, *Philadelphia Police Department*, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 24.

6. Community Legitimacy

In the previous sections, this report discussed the organizational and operational challenges PPD faces as a result of its resource allocation and deployment practices and decisions. It has focused on the necessity for PPD to factor the needs, perspectives, and feedbacks of the communities it serves into its decision-making process and determine the amount of personnel and programmatic resources necessary to meet those needs. Doing so is a critical opportunity for PPD to build community trust and legitimacy and ultimately improve public safety outcomes. Community legitimacy ensures that the public has trust and confidence in the police, accept the police's authority, and believe officers operate fairly.

Successful community policing is achieved through an ongoing dialogue with the community about community concerns and potential solutions to address them. This dialogue should directly inform where a department chooses to invest time, money, and resources and should include responding to community feedback about police presence in their neighborhood. Without this dialogue, inefficiencies can occur as a department unintentionally perpetuates or constructs practices that are counter-productive to a sustainable, positive relationship with its community, and therefore hinder long-term policing effectiveness.

PPD seemingly agrees with the importance of connecting with the community to improve police community relations and public safety outcomes. In its Crime Prevention and Violence Reduction Plan, PPD wrote, "It is essential that we fully understand the needs, ideals, and concerns of community members in order to serve them well."⁷³ The report went on to discuss PPD's focus on community engagement as a means to "...understand how we can best provide police services to those in Philadelphia."

By using techniques to collect structured, detailed feedback from the community, in addition to means of qualitative feedback and engagement, PPD could develop strategies to refine the deployment of financial and human resources as well as highlight opportunities for officers to be seen in communities, interacting with community members, and building trust, credibility, legitimacy, accountability, and transparency.

Building a community's trust in the police is vital to protecting that community. The following section will explore some of PPD's programs, methods, and opportunities to improve community legitimacy.

⁷³ "Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan", *Philadelphia Police Department*, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 10.

Body-Worn Cameras

Body-worn cameras, when utilized effectively, can be a useful tool not only for police oversight, but also for training purposes. Further, the effective implementation of body-worn cameras can impact the culture of police, inform the development of strategies intended to build trust, credibility and legitimacy with community, and result in better compliance with standard procedures.

PPD first piloted the use of body-worn cameras in the 22nd District in December 2014,⁷⁴ with a full implementation of a body-worn camera program beginning in FY 2016. As shown below, PPD has made a significant investment in body-worn cameras over the past several fiscal years. Currently, the department has implemented approximately 3,400 cameras across 18 of Philadelphia’s 21 patrol districts.

TABLE 4: PPD SPENDING ON BODY-WORN CAMERAS, FY 2016 – FY 2021⁷⁵

Description	FY 2016	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	Total
Cameras and Accessories	\$196,200	\$20,463	-	\$536,218	\$311,813	\$38,373	\$1,103,066
Software Costs	-	-	-	\$291,367	\$1,024,058	\$1,444,392	\$2,759,817
Capital Improvements	-	-	-	\$180,116	\$67,461	\$64,746	\$312,324
Total	\$196,200	\$20,463	-	\$1,007,701	\$1,403,332	\$1,547,511	\$4,175,206

In total, 95% of the body-worn camera spending since FY 2016 occurred between FY 2019 and FY 2021. As evidenced by the FY 2020 and FY 2021 software spending in excess of \$1 million per year, the department will continue to incur significant costs related to the software necessary to store body-worn camera footage, which is commonly the most expensive aspect of a body-worn camera program.⁷⁶

In interviews with Stout, PPD said it plans to add 600 more cameras for the remaining three patrol districts and specialized units such as highway patrol, traffic patrol, airport, and strike force, within the next year. Once completed, every officer who is on patrol will have a body-worn camera.


According to PPD, patrol officers receive their body-worn cameras at the beginning of their shift and are instructed to immediately place the camera into “Stand-by” mode.⁷⁷ Body-worn cameras must be activated prior to responding to a call for service, during all law-enforcement related

⁷⁴ “Body Worn Camera Pilot Program Executive Summary”, Philadelphia Police Department, July 15, 2015.

⁷⁵ Spending amounts are per detailed expenditure data from the FAMIS system, based on vendor names which were included in PPD budgets related to body-worn cameras, and line-item descriptions of the expenditures.

⁷⁶ “Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned”, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Department of Justice, 2014, p. 32.

⁷⁷ When activated from “Stand-by” mode, the body-worn camera records 60 seconds of image, without audio, immediately preceding the activation. Based on discussions with PPD, this allows for instances in which an officer is unable to turn their camera on immediately prior to an encounter due to certain circumstances (e.g., the officer must first take action to ensure their own safety).



encounters, and during all activities involving the general public.⁷⁸ With few exceptions, once a body-worn camera is activated, it must remain activated until the event has concluded. In the instance the camera is deactivated prior to the conclusion of the event, the officer must state aloud the reason it is being deactivated.


The use of body-worn camera footage is well outlined in its governing directive; however, the directive distinctly limits the use of footage in ways that could help to build community trust and legitimacy. For example, audits and footage inspection is “limited to compliance with the provisions of this directive and shall not be conducted for the purpose of discovering disciplinary infractions.” This includes supervisory and departmental review. Stout requested any documentation showing PPD’s review of body-worn camera footage, including a written policy outlining the formal review / audit program. PPD referred Stout to the body-worn camera directive but provided no documentation or proof that PPD conducts the reviews and random audits as discussed in the directive.

Utilizing footage as a training tool for various situations can improve the effectiveness of police response and gradually improve the culture of police. However, the directive states that body-worn camera footage can only be used for training, critique, early intervention inquiries, civil claims, administrative inquiries, or addressing behavioral / performance deficiencies with good cause and prior authorization from the commanding officer.

The public release of body-worn camera footage can be an important element of the strategic use of this technology. As with other data and information collected and analyzed by police departments, the public release of body-worn camera footage can create transparency and accountability. When the footage released demonstrates harmful conduct or conduct incompatible with standard procedures, it can cause unrest among the community. PPD should be mindful of the historical harm that certain policing tactics have had in many communities, especially Black and Brown communities. When releasing body-worn camera footage, PPD should acknowledge the wrong-doing and be prepared to demonstrate how it will hold the officers involved accountable for their actions. Such transparency and acknowledgement can, over time, begin to rebuild trust and legitimacy with the community.

Body-worn cameras can be an effective tool for improving the effectiveness and transparency of a police department, however, PPD’s current usage of body-worn cameras could be improved. PPD should develop a formal documentation process for the audit and inspections of body-worn camera footage and explore producing public-facing reports regarding the results of these audits. PPD should consider whether the current directive meets the safety and transparency expectations of the community and explore ways in which its body-worn camera program could be adjusted accordingly. PPD should expand the use of body-worn camera footage to support officer training, as well increase access of footage to residents. These steps can enhance transparency and trust

⁷⁸ Directive 4.21, “Body-Worn Cameras (BWC)”, Philadelphia Police Department, last updated May 20, 2019.



within the community and maximize the value it receives from the investment it has made, and will continue to make, in this technology and infrastructure.

PPD commissioned a study on body-worn cameras, funded by the National Institute of Justice and conducted by researchers from Temple University's Criminal Justice Department, beginning in 2019. The study, which is ongoing, has conducted focus groups and surveys with officers and community members in PPD's 14th, 17th, 26th, and 35th Districts, both before and after the department's implementation of body-worn cameras. This study, once published, will provide insight into the perception of body-worn cameras – both within the department and in the community. PPD can utilize the community feedback gathered in this study to further inform its strategic usage of body-worn cameras.

Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program and Co-Responding Strategies

Strategies for de-escalating mental health situations offer an opportunity to build trust with the community by allowing greater access to social services for the people who need them and limiting the trauma, harm, and crisis that can be created when these situations are not effectively de-escalated. For example, co-responding, when a police officer is paired with a mental health professional while responding to situations involving mental health, can lower the chance of arrests occurring — in Ithaca, New York, a subcommittee found that approximately one third of community 911 calls could be dealt with through either a co-response relationship or an unarmed officer.⁷⁹ These models have demonstrated that in many instances community members are experiencing circumstances that require a crisis intervention, but not necessarily a police officer (or exclusively a police officer).

By centering the form of response on the need of the individual, a more complete and effective intervention can be delivered by a professional trained in providing that specific intervention. Doing so can limit the harmful impacts that can arise when a police officer (not trained in complex mental health crises, for example) solely responds to a person experiencing such crises. A person not appropriately trained for the circumstance is more likely to rely on the actions they are trained in – which, for police officers may more likely involve arrest and incarceration. When community members experiencing personal crises are arrested and incarcerated, the individuals, families and neighborhoods impacted may experience this response as uncaring, unsympathetic, and destructive to the lives of the individuals and neighborhoods involved – essentially criminalizing mental health challenges and perpetuating cycles of incarceration, poverty, eviction, and other impacts. The reverse can happen when the response provides an empathetic intervention designed to minimize the harm to the individual and ensure they are receiving the supportive services they need – it can build trust between police and the community. Over time, if communities observe that police are dispatched for circumstances that require the specific training, skills and expertise of a police officer, and that other models are used when community members are experiencing circumstances

⁷⁹ “Implementing The City of Ithaca's New Public Safety Agency,” Reimagining Public Safety (Ithaca & Tompkins County, New York) and the Center for Policing Equity, 2022, p. 22.

or crises that do not require a police officer, they are likely to develop a renewed sense of trust in police.

Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Program

A CIT program is a curriculum for police that is designed to lower the risk of serious injury or death occurring when people with mental health challenges and police officer(s) have an emergency interaction. The curriculum involves 40 hours of training and is typically offered to voluntary and self-selected officers, though some agencies have made this training mandatory.⁸⁰ According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness, CIT reduces both the risk of people experiencing mental health crises being arrested while also increasing the likelihood that they will receive mental health services.⁸¹

PPD has a voluntary CIT program, and as of May 2022, 3,036 officers (50.7% of all PPD officers) had received the training. Increasing the number of CIT-trained officers and prioritizing the deployment of these officers, when possible, can make police response more effective when an individual is experiencing a mental health crisis.


Co-Responder Units

In FY 2022, Philadelphia began a pilot program of a 911 Triage and Co-Responders Strategy. The program received \$5.2 million of funding in the Managing Director's Office FY 2022 budget. The program assigns behavioral health navigators from the Department of Behavioral Health and Intellectual disAbility Services to PPD's radio room and has placed crisis response teams on the street. When a call is identified as being a behavioral health issue, the radio room assigns a crisis response team member to respond to the event along with police to ensure that the most impactful level of help is provided to the individual. In instances in which a crisis response team member is unavailable to respond, radio will dispatch a CIT-trained officer.

As this pilot program was first created and funded in the FY 2022 budget, a full review of the program was outside the scope of this assessment. However, it is important to note that adequate data collection is necessary for evaluation of this strategy to determine its effectiveness and make adjustments as needed. PPD did not provide any specific metrics or detail about data collection and evaluation for the 911 Triage and Co-Responders Strategy when asked.

⁸⁰ Michael S. Rogers, Dale E. McNiel, and Renée L. Binder, "Effectiveness of Police Crisis Intervention Training Programs," *Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online*, Vol. 50, Issue 1, March 1, 2022.

⁸¹ "Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs," National Alliance on Mental Illness, 2022, *available at* [https://www.nami.org/Advocacy/Crisis-Intervention/Crisis-Intervention-Team-\(CIT\)-Programs](https://www.nami.org/Advocacy/Crisis-Intervention/Crisis-Intervention-Team-(CIT)-Programs).



PPD also launched the Crisis Intervention Response Team (CIRT) model that utilizes teams of officers and mental health clinicians to respond to crisis-related calls. In total, the program has four teams. According to PPD, the program and associated data collection is in its infancy. PPD stated that the City is collecting data, such as the number and location of encounters handled by the CIRT teams, as well as the outcomes of these encounters and the demographic information of the individuals served. PPD also said that this data would be used to help target the geographical areas with the highest need for services and to determine how to better serve this population.

As stated in previous sections of this report, data collection and evaluation has been inadequate to appropriately inform decision making at PPD. To ensure the data collected will support PPD's stated goals of improving and targeting service delivery, a comprehensive data and evaluation strategy should be developed.

As a co-responding strategy strengthens the department's relationship with its community, a department may be able to realize the benefits associated with that relationship: a faster and less-expensive response to crime or community disruptions. Co-response can also reduce the costs associated with officer and civilian injuries during confrontations that involve mental health and decrease the short- and long-term costs of incarceration. PPD's CIT and co-responder strategies may, if well implemented, foster community trust and legitimacy, and appear to address some questions raised by the fatal shooting of Walter Wallace, Jr. in October 2020. However, proper implementation and potential effectiveness should be informed by comprehensive evaluation.

Additionally, co-responding strategies should be centered on the voiced needs of the community and designed to be an intentional response to those needs, with the flexibility to be customized based on a hyper-local level (such as at the neighborhood, zip code, or block level). Those needs may indicate a desire for increased use of non-police first responders, such as the City's Behavioral Health Mobile Crisis units. PPD should be a willing and active partner in routing calls for service not requiring a police response to the appropriate agency. While PPD has stated its intention to do this, PPD must collect the data necessary to understand and adapt its programming, as well as scale it to appropriately respond to the voiced needs of the community.

Philadelphia Police Assisted Diversion

Philadelphia Police Assisted Diversion (PAD) is a pilot program which began in December 2017, designed to respond to low-level and non-violent crimes (such as the purchasing and possession of drugs, prostitution, and retail theft) through a less punitive means that is designed to grant the participant access to the social services that meet their needs. PAD is overseen by the Managing Director's Office of Criminal Justice. Through this program, when a person is stopped for a qualifying offense, they can choose to enroll in the program, and a PAD staff member will address any present needs and plan an in-depth intake within two days. According to a qualitative study of PAD, repeated arrest for drug-related crimes is counter-productive and may trap people in a cycle

leading only to future arrests. The PAD program trains police officers to divert people who would have been arrested, instead, to services that may deal with their underlying issue.⁸²

This program allows officers to redirect the time associated with a police response elsewhere, build trust and credibility with the community, meet the needs of that community, and reduce costs associated with arrest (such as incarceration, court-time, and employment/family disruption resulting from arrest). The budget for PAD comes from the City's Managing Director's Office, and in FY 2021, the current pilot version of PAD received \$2.2 million. During interviews with PPD, representatives from PAD stated the goal is to implement the program on a city-wide, 24/7 basis, and that this full implementation would cost the City approximately \$6 million annually. Based on interviews with the Managing Director's Office, a quantitative study of PAD is being conducted but has not yet been completed. At the time of this report, no data has been made available related to the number of diversions, effect of PAD on crime rates, and overall success of the program. Based on the lack of quantitative evidence which has been released, the effectiveness of PAD is still unclear.

Clearance Rates

A clearance rate is the share of cases deemed solved by police in relation to the total number of crimes reported. Clearance rates across the United States have declined consistently over the past twenty years. As of 2020, the nationwide clearance rate for homicide was approximately 50%, and the clearance rates for other types of violent crimes (such as robberies, manslaughter, rape, and assault), ranged from 27% to 69%. Clearance rates for property crimes (such as burglary, thefts, and arson) were lower, ranging from 12% to 21%.⁸³

In recent years, PPD's clearance rate for homicides has declined to approximately 40%, while the number of homicides has increased dramatically.⁸⁴ This is part of a broader trend that has seen PPD's clearance rate decline for several types of crimes. Clearance rates for nonfatal shootings declined to 19% in FY 2021 from a high of 27% in FY 2015, while the rates for aggravated assaults, robberies, and Part 1 property crimes have also all declined over the same period.


Philadelphia's clearance rate stands in stark contrast to Phoenix and San Antonio, the two cities with total population most comparable to Philadelphia. Phoenix and San Antonio cleared 63.2% and 65.2% of homicides, respectively, from 2016 to 2020. This compares to Philadelphia's clearance rate of 44.8% over the same time period.⁸⁵ New York, Los Angeles, and Houston, the

⁸² Evan Anderson, Ruth Shefner, Rebecca Koppel, Cariné Megeriana, Rosemary Frassof, "Experiences with the Philadelphia police assisted diversion program: A qualitative study," *International Journal of Drug Policy*.

⁸³ Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program data (available at <https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/pages/downloads>), as processed by Jacob Kaplan of Princeton University, (available at <https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/100707/version/V17/view>).

⁸⁴ Quarterly City Managers Report for the Period Ending June 30, 2022, City of Philadelphia Budget Office., available at <https://www.phila.gov/media/20220818093154/Quarterly-City-Managers-Report-June-30-2022-1.pdf>.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*



three largest cities in the country reporting homicide clearance data to the FBI, had clearance rates during this time period of 67.6%, 70.1% and 47.2%, respectively. Philadelphia has the lowest clearance rate of any of the 10 largest cities in the U.S. reporting homicide clearance data to the FBI.⁸⁶

Clearance rates function as an important, though imperfect, metric for police departments to track. Clearance rates are simply one measurement technique to understand the frequency of arrests related to crimes – it should not be considered a dispositive assessment of policing effectiveness.

However, improving clearance rates is critical for PPD. Higher clearance rates achieved using methods that are responsive to the needs of the community can positively impact public perception of the police and build a community trust. But also, higher clearance rates can lead to a reduction in future crime.

To improve clearance rates for fatal and nonfatal shootings, PPD has launched two new efforts: Shooting Investigations Group (SIG) and Weekly Shooting Review.

Shooting Investigations Group

SIG is a unit with 40 detectives who are dedicated to investigating nonfatal shootings.⁸⁷ Prior to the creation of the special unit, nonfatal shootings were assigned to detectives geographically, the same as other non-homicide investigations. According to PPD, having nonfatal shootings investigated by a centralized group, similar to how homicides are investigated, encouraged collaboration, which can help identify commonalities among open cases. This should lead to faster response to nonfatal shootings by detectives, as well as continuity in investigation, as cases are no longer passed off to other detectives once they have begun.

SIG was launched in January 2022 and a comprehensive review of its effectiveness is beyond the scope of this report. However, PPD should collect appropriate data related to SIG and plan to evaluate the program using metrics including clearance rates, community support interventions provided, reduction in shootings in hot-spot areas, etc.

Weekly Shooting Review

Each week, PPD convenes a meeting with local, state and federal law enforcement partners to discuss recent shootings all recent shootings are discussed in order to identify patterns, at-risk individuals, and determine a strategy for both the investigation of the shooting and


⁸⁶ Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program data (*available at* <https://crime-data-explorer.fr.cloud.gov/pages/downloads>), as processed by Jacob Kaplan of Princeton University, (*available at* <https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/100707/version/V17/view>).

⁸⁷ Anna Orso and Chris Palmer, “Philadelphia police have a new unit to investigate shootings. But can it improve their success rate?”, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 20, 2022.

for future violence reduction.⁸⁸ In addition to discussing the shooting, the meeting serves as an opportunity for PPD and its partners to identify which organizations can provide necessary assistance in solving the shootings discussed and discuss strategies to prevent future shootings.

The weekly shooting review could be a positive collaborative effort between law enforcement partners, but its effects on crime prevention and reduction may be difficult to quantify.

According to PPD, another mechanism for improving clearance rates is expanding and updating its forensic investigation capabilities. Funding for PPD’s Office of Forensic Science (OFS) has increased only slightly over the past three years, despite increases in evidence volume. With regard to shooting crimes in particular, the number of crime guns recovered⁸⁹ by PPD increased each year from 2019 to 2021.




In interviews with Stout, PPD stated that it has requested increases for forensic services in previous budgets, but the increases have often been limited to purchases of new instruments and small increases in staffing levels, and all budget increases have been limited based on the capacity limitations of the current facility which OFS has occupied since 2003. In the most recent Five Year Plan, the City budgeted \$50 million in capital funding for OFS.

In terms of staff, PPD’s current authorized strength for OFS is 216 personnel (which includes both uniform and civilian personnel), and only 164 of these positions are filled. In interviews with Stout,

⁸⁸ “Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Action Plan”, Philadelphia Police Department, June 2020, available at <https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/programs-and-services/CrimePreventionViolenceReductionActionPlan62020.pdf>, p. 15.

⁸⁹ Crime guns are defined as any gun recovered by the police as part of a criminal investigation, and do not include guns which have been recovered as a result of buy backs or turn ins.




PPD estimated OFS would require 335 personnel, comprised of forensic examiners, technicians, and management and administrative positions to sufficiently meet evidence processing demands. Stout has not independently verified this estimate. It is important to note that increasing the budgeted headcount for OFS is only useful if it can fill the available positions, and its current staffing levels would suggest that may be difficult. As mentioned previously in the recruitment section of this report, PPD should develop and implement recruitment strategies that focus on diversity, and specific skill-based positions.

For PPD, improving clearance rates will require a thorough understanding of the effect of its deployment strategy and resource allocation on solving crimes, such as homicide detective caseload, the data it collects and how that data is used to solve or reduce crime, its current forensic capabilities, and its community engagement strategy. Improving clearance rates may also involve investments in community policing. The data gathered from tracking clearance rates and methods may be used to highlight the areas where resources can be best allocated, resulting in long-term fiscal savings as clearing an individual crime can be done with greater speed, less expense, and a more positive impact on the community.


Importantly, efforts to improve clearance rates should be carefully considered and intertwined with more comprehensive strategies to respond to the needs of the community and work to improve the community's perception of trust and legitimacy of police. Such strategies can have the effect of reducing crime in addition to more effectively responding to the crime that does occur. While clearance rates may improve through greater participation by the community, it is the responsibility of police to build the trust and legitimacy of police in the community such that community is willing to participate in activities that may improve the quality of investigations conducted by police.

Recommendations

- **Continued investment in community trust, credibility, and legitimacy between PPD and communities it serves.** When a community does not trust police and police do not have legitimacy in the community, it is less likely that community will be willing to assist police in efforts to reduce or respond to crime. Community members may also fear retaliation from their community if they cooperate with police. Improving trust between community and police and demonstrating legitimacy of policing to community members is essential to the effective use of police resources in responding to community needs, responding to crime, and preventing crime.
- **Allocate adequate funding to ensure data relevant to community policing can be collected.** This funding will be used to analyze data surrounding encounters with the community and can be invested in database infrastructure and administration, data visualization, data analysis and the appropriately skilled staff to leverage, maintain, and refine these tools. Data relating to community policing should be integrated with all other available data (financial spending and department budgeting, 911 calls, clearance rates, etc.).

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- **Complete the distribution of body-worn cameras and broaden the usage of footage collected by the cameras.** In addition to the current purposes for which body-worn camera footage is utilized, there are opportunities for PPD to expand its usage of body-worn camera footage. PPD should consider reviewing and releasing body-worn camera footage from high-profile events, including those in which a situation escalated to become violent, as doing so can help the department better understand how officers respond to various situations, and can take the necessary steps to discipline or train the officer, as needed. In addition, the release of such footage outwardly demonstrates to community that the police department is accepting responsibility for its actions and taking action when harmful incidents occur. Footage from instances in which an officer appropriately handles a difficult situation can also be an effective tool to train other officers on how to handle similar situations.
 - **Share the methods and results of PPD's body-worn camera study.** A study commissioned by PPD regarding officer and public perception of PPD's implementation and usage of body-worn cameras is ongoing. Once completed, PPD should share the results of this study with the public and utilize its findings for continued community engagement and to improve its operations and interactions with residents.
 - **Develop a sustainable, long-term commitment and process to hear from community members.** The department should solicit feedback from community members to understand the key issues and ways police can deliver safety. PPD should listen to the voiced concerns from the community and continuously assess how to strategically respond to the community's needs. Techniques which collect structured, detailed feedback from the community, such as community surveys, focus groups, and structured interviews, can create opportunities for PPD to develop strategies to refine its deployment of resources, as well as identify opportunities for officers to be present in communities, interacting with community members, and building trust, legitimacy, accountability, and transparency, which can ultimately lead to enhanced community collaboration with law enforcement. Feedback from the community should consider both informal and formal means of collecting information and data. Informal feedback could be collected from listening sessions and online submissions. Even in informal settings, feedback should be carefully tracked, shared, and integrated with discussions with internal and external stakeholders. Formal means of collecting feedback, such as focus groups and interviews conducted by trained professionals, provide additional opportunities for analysis, transparency, and accountability. Formal feedback mechanisms could also include periodic comprehensive community surveys, regular feedback submitted by brief micro-surveys accessible through QR codes, feedback submitted through community-based kiosks, etc. By regularly using a combination of these feedback mechanisms, the feedback can be both broad and deep and in combination can help regularly and iteratively inform the culture of policing internally and the opportunities to continually learn from community feedback. All such feedback should be integrated with other data collected to develop comprehensive policing strategies that can be iteratively refined based on the experience of police and feedback from the community.

- **Enable and empower other City departments and agencies to participate in the development and implementation of public safety strategies.** As described above, by considering how to relinquish police department responsibilities to other departments with the expertise and legitimacy needed to take on certain tasks that have fallen to police or become the responsibility of police, officers can be engaged in the activities requiring officers and other community stakeholders and City agencies can respond to other needs of the community. With a commitment to partnership and collaboration, the integration of these City agencies (in particular, City agencies and community stakeholders involved in behavioral health and intellectual or developmental disabilities as well as the homelessness response system and continuum of care) can more effectively, sustainably, and efficiently respond to community needs and regularly engage with community to inform the evaluation and implementation of those strategies.
- **Develop means of creating transparency with communities.** This can include strategies such as public data sharing and community forums. Additionally, transparency could be increased by having an open dialogue with the community about what activities police officers undertake daily and what they are trained to do. There may be a lack of understanding around day-to-day policing activities by the community, and it could be a barrier to building trust and transparency within communities. Clear, intuitive, easy-to-understand dashboards, infographics, diagrams, and other presentations should be used to present information to the public and should be reviewed, if not controlled, by external parties to ensure the community will trust the accuracy and presentation of the data. The data presented should include information demonstrating police activities in each neighborhood, the results of those outcomes, feedback from those communities (positive and negative), and other data that can demonstrate the impact of policing in Philadelphia communities.
- **Establish a comprehensive co-response strategy considering voiced community needs.** Soliciting feedback from the community surrounding co-responding methods and strategies will increase law enforcement's perceived legitimacy, accountability, and transparency while also helping to build a co-response approach that meets the voiced needs of the community.
- **Develop a comprehensive data strategy.** A comprehensive data strategy considers all available data (quantitative and qualitative) that can be used to inform stakeholders regarding the effective development of operational strategies and evaluation. PPD should inventory all data currently available and identify data not yet available that should be collected. It should then develop a data strategy that considers how frequently the data is collected, where it will be stored, how the integrity of the data will be evaluated, the business rules that will be used for its analysis, the methods of presentation, and the stakeholders with whom it will be shared (internal and external). It should seek feedback from these stakeholders regarding the types of data and analysis that would be impactful and helpful for them. When possible, these stakeholders should be involved in the ongoing development and implementation of the data strategy. This data strategy can then become a foundation on which effective operational strategies and iterative, ongoing stakeholder engagement can be conducted.

- 
- **Fully integrate 911 call data analysis with co-response strategies and overall data strategies.** An analysis of current 911 call data can help law enforcement identify the volume, type, and location of calls where co-responding would be appropriate.
 - **Continue offering CIT training for all officers.** CIT training lowers the risk of serious injuries occurring to both officers and civilians in the event of an emergency interaction involving mental health. PPD’s CIT training is voluntary, and the PPD currently requires CIT officers to take refresher trainings every two years.⁹⁰ Encouraging all officers to take CIT training and participate in ongoing CIT education can result in greater protection for law enforcement and the public and help to improve the department’s relationship with its community.

* * * * *

The procedures performed were limited to those described herein based on the documents provided, and interviews with the City and PPD staff. Information obtained subsequent to the date of this report may affect this analysis. The procedures were performed solely with respect to the above referenced engagement. This report is not to be reproduced, distributed, disclosed or used for any other purpose.

The sufficiency of the scope and procedures of our engagement is solely the responsibility of the management of the Controller’s Office. Consequently, we make no representations regarding the sufficiency of the scope and procedures described in the attached document either for the purpose for which this report has been requested or for any other purpose.

Stout Risius Ross, LLC
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
October 18, 2022

⁹⁰ Directive 10.9, “Crisis Intervention Training”, Philadelphia Police Department, last updated September 05, 2017.

Appendix A: Interviews Conducted by Stout

The following PPD personnel were interviewed by Stout:⁹¹

Staff Inspector Jerrold Bates - 75-48A Compliance Unit
Captain Colleen Billups – Commanding Officer, 9th Police District
James Cadden – Administrative Services Director
Chief Inspector Michael Cochrane – Support Services
Deputy Commissioner Christine Coulter – Organizational Services⁹²
Deputy Commissioner Joel Dales – Patrol Operations
Lieutenant James Ferguson, Administrative Lieutenant, Organizational Services
Officer Michael Edinger – Police Communications Bureau
Michael Garvey – Director, Office of Forensic Science
Captain Matthew Gillespie – Commanding Officer, Southwest Detective Division
Captain Joe Green – Commanding Officer, 12th Police District
Staff Inspector Francis Healy – Special Advisor to the Commissioner
April Jones – Administrative Officer
Dr. George Kikuchi – Law Enforcement Analyst Manager, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center
Captain James Kimrey – Commanding Officer, 2nd Police District
Lieutenant Joseph Lapetina – PCIC/PIIN Administration Unit
Detective Aubrey Lewis – PCIC/PIIN Administration Unit
Chief Inspector Altovise Love-Craighead – Community Relations Bureau
Melissa Lumpkin – Payroll Supervisor
Captain Myesha Massey – Commanding Officer, 35th Police District
Heather McCaffrey – PPD Personnel Director
Captain Tyrell McCoy – Commanding Officer, Recruit Background Investigations
Captain Fredric McQuiggan – Commanding Officer, PCIC/PIIN Administration Unit
Carlton Mosley – Programmer, PCIC/PIIN Administration Unit
Deputy Commissioner Ben Naish (retired), Investigations
Chief Blake Norton – Chief Strategy Officer
Captain Michael O’Donnell – Commanding Officer, 17th Police District
Molly O’Neill – Occupational Safety Administrator II
Captain Pedro Rosario – Commanding Officer, 24th Police District
Kevin Thomas – Director of Research and Analysis, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center
Chief Frank Vanore, Detective Bureau, Investigations⁹³
Sabrinea Wallace – Fiscal Officer
Captain Steven Wheeler – Commanding Officer, 25th Police District

⁹¹ In some cases, individuals were interviewed more than once.

⁹² Rank at the time of the assessment process

⁹³ Rank at the time of the assessment process



Chief Inspector Dennis Wilson – Communications Bureau

In addition to the interviews conducted with PPD personnel, we also interacted with the following organizations, departments, and individuals:

Citizens Police Oversight Commission (“CPOC”), a Philadelphia-based group aimed at helping to improve the relationship between the police and the community (Anthony Erace – Executive Director, Police Advisory Commission).

City of Philadelphia Law Department (Andrew Richman – Chief of Staff to the City Solicitor, City of Philadelphia Law Department).


City of Philadelphia Office of Risk Management (Barry Scott – Risk Manager).

Community Advisory and Accountability Council (“CAAC”), a coalition of community leaders, religious leaders, and residents selected by the Controller’s office to support our review.

Philadelphia Police Assisted Diversion Program (“PAD”), a pilot program for diverting low-level offenders away from the criminal justice system and towards supportive, peer-based social services that are customized to the participants' needs (Kurt August – Interim Director, Managing Director's Office of Criminal Justice).

Temple University Criminal Justice Department (Jennifer Wood – Professor and Chair, Department of Criminal Justice, Elizabeth Groff – Professor, Department of Criminal Justice).

Appendix B: Map of Philadelphia Police Divisions, Districts, and Service Areas



Appendix C: Overtime by Overtime Code (in \$ Thousands), FY 2017 – FY 2021

Includes all codes that totaled \$1M+ in spending in any year from FY 2017 to FY 2021

OT Code	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019	FY 2020	FY 2021	Total
REIMBURSED FUNDS	\$17,071 (16%)	\$20,274 (20%)	\$22,504 (24%)	\$19,700 (18%)	\$14,960 (19%)	\$94,510 (19%)
CRIME PLAN	16,140 (15%)	19,549 (20%)	20,911 (22%)	27,744 (25%)	5,062 (6%)	89,406 (18%)
CRIM COURT CITY HALL	15,847 (15%)	14,340 (14%)	12,308 (13%)	8,010 (7%)	2,416 (3%)	52,922 (11%)
EXHIBITIONS	695 (1%)	784 (1%)	480 (1%)	17,167 (16%)	23,798 (29%)	42,924 (9%)
INVEST. DETECTIVE	5,272 (5%)	5,756 (6%)	5,706 (6%)	6,605 (6%)	8,111 (10%)	31,450 (6%)
ABSENTEE REPLACE	4,210 (4%)	4,629 (5%)	5,103 (5%)	4,298 (4%)	4,840 (6%)	23,080 (5%)
DISTRICT DIV COURT	4,937 (5%)	5,382 (5%)	5,556 (6%)	4,164 (4%)	2,766 (3%)	22,806 (5%)
ARREST	2,752 (3%)	3,170 (3%)	3,393 (4%)	3,430 (3%)	3,875 (5%)	16,621 (3%)
DNC 2016	12,017 (11%)	- (0%)	- (0%)	- (0%)	- (0%)	12,017 (2%)
AIRPORT SECURITY	2,075 (2%)	2,601 (3%)	2,759 (3%)	2,264 (2%)	1,019 (1%)	10,717 (2%)
INV. PLAINCLOTHES	1,859 (2%)	1,944 (2%)	1,987 (2%)	2,322 (2%)	1,939 (2%)	10,050 (2%)
SECURITY DETAILS	2,057 (2%)	1,565 (2%)	1,618 (2%)	1,647 (1%)	1,225 (2%)	8,113 (2%)
ADMINISTRATIVE	1,956 (2%)	1,677 (2%)	1,488 (2%)	1,372 (1%)	1,467 (2%)	7,959 (2%)
DEMONSTRATIONS	5,011 (5%)	801 (1%)	517 (1%)	195 (0%)	1,275 (2%)	7,799 (2%)
CROWD CONTROL	142 (0%)	3,339 (3%)	577 (1%)	408 (0%)	- (0%)	4,467 (1%)
DETAIL						
TRAFFIC DETAIL	1,174 (1%)	1,236 (1%)	936 (1%)	632 (1%)	2 (0%)	3,981 (1%)
OTHER CODES	3,373 (3%)	3,341 (3%)	1,957 (2%)	4,191 (4%)	2,948 (2%)	14,810 (3%)
Total	\$96,587 (92%)	\$90,390 (91%)	\$87,800 (92%)	\$104,149 (94%)	\$74,706 (92%)	\$453,632 (92%)

Response to Review from Philadelphia Police Department



CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

DANIELLE M. OUTLAW

Police Commissioner
400 N. Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19130
(215) 686-3367
FAX (215) 625-0612

October 11, 2022

Rebecca Rhynhart
City Controller
1230 Municipal Services Building
1401 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1679

City Controller Rhynhart:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the recent special review of the Philadelphia Police Department focused on overall spending practices, to include deployment, training and administrative functions across police districts. I, along with my Executive team believe that Stout, the Center for Policing Equity and Horsey, Buckner & Heffler conducted a thorough review.

I am grateful that the Philadelphia Police Department has the opportunity to provide feedback to the review. Please find our responses in page order from the final review that was completed in September 2022.

Please let me know if you have questions about the responses provided to you and your team.

Best wishes,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Danielle M. Outlaw'.

Danielle M. Outlaw
Police Commissioner

DO/bln

Philadelphia Police Response to City Controller Stout Team Assessment:

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- **Implement civilianization program. PPD has commissioned a review of potential areas within the department that could be civilianized. Using the findings of this report, PPD should civilianize certain roles within the department**

Response: The PPD has started the civilianization process. PPD has been using the report it commissioned on civilianization as a guide to identify positions and roles that could be transitioned to non-sworn personnel. The PPD with the Managing Director's Office, engaged in an arbitration hearing in August 2022, to request civilianization of specific roles at the Department. The City is waiting to get the results of that arbitration by the end of October. We will continue to seek to add civilian positions to work units, as part of the annual budget process, as needs are identified, where non-sworn personnel would be needed to fill key roles.

- **Review current recruiting requirements. PPD should analyze the current recruiting requirements it has in place and understand if there are any requirements in place, which act as a deterrent to otherwise interested candidates. PPD should explore opportunities to make changes to its eligibility criteria for the police force if the department feels these changes would have a positive impact on recruitment.**

Response: The PPD has been actively reviewing current recruiting methods. PPD has collaborated with local nonprofits and academics to help candidates prepare for the physical agility and the Nelson Denny Reading Test. The current age requirement was recently changed from twenty-two (22) years of age to twenty (20) years of age at the time of their submission of an application. This change was made with the expectation that each candidate will complete the Police Academy by 21 years of age, which is the most common age in other large municipalities. The PPD has attempted to change the reading test, which is governed at the state level by Municipal Police Officers Training and Education Commission (<https://mpoetc.psp.pa.gov/Pages/mpoetc.aspx>), but this process is still on-going.

Furthermore, the legislation previously enacted regarding the residency of Police Officer Recruits required all candidates to reside in the City of Philadelphia for one year before beginning the police academy. The legislation has since been overturned because of the Civil Service Commission requiring that all candidates be granted a waiver that provides each person an opportunity to move within the city limits within one year after they are appointed to begin the academy.

- **Identify and analyze potential new recruitment strategies and develop a comprehensive plan to increase PPD's diversity. PPD should design and implement new recruitment strategies, particularly those focused on attracting female and minority candidates.**

Response: The PPD Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Officer has been hired to review best practices regarding recruiting, hiring, and overall retention of a diverse pool of employees.

The Recruit Background Investigations Unit has added new mechanisms to track demographic trends in hiring and to gauge the success rates of all applicants at various points in the process so that real-time adjustments can be made.

Additionally, PPD is actively working with local and state officials regarding the certification of police officers within the city and any real or perceived obstacles that may exist for potential candidates. It should be noted that both the

reading and agility portions of the hiring process are governed by state requirements imposed by the Municipal Police Officers Training and Education Commission.

The PPD is part of the 30X30 Initiative (<https://30x30initiative.org/>), which is a national effort focused on increasing female representation in policing. Additionally, in the PPD FY23 Budget, funds for developing a recruitment plan or funded needed software and resources for recruitment were approved for the first time.

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- **Based on interviews with District Captains, these requests can sometimes come with no advance notice prior to the day of the event, and they are unable to decline the request. These challenges can further reduce the number of officers available for patrol in a district at any given time.**

Response: The Philadelphia Police Department develops deployment plans for all events and operations, and is very cognizant to provide as much advance notice to personnel regarding their assignments for such events and operations. However, there are public safety emergencies and events that have not afforded the PPD to provide advance notice, as was the case in the summer of 2020, with the national civil unrest, rioting and looting. This is a balance that police agencies grapple with, and PPD continues to try to address how to balance this as emergency deployments arise.

Page 34

- **Based on the information presented on the card, it is unclear how this information would provide useful insight to District Captains in adjusting the weekly plan for their pinpoint areas.**

Response: Pinpoint Grid report cards are not manually created by analysts, they are generated by the Police GIS system. These report cards serve as a snapshot of the status of the pinpoint grid, including crime statistics and deployment time.

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- **Additionally, while the City of Philadelphia does not have a 411 line for mental health issues, PPD has a mental health delegate in the 911 radio room every day during the day shift and from 3 pm to 11 pm who assists with calls as needed. PPD also transfers suicidal calls to a crisis hotline. Redirecting other non-emergency calls, such as complaints of a barking dog or vandalism, to other City agencies can help to alleviate the demands on officers and increase PPD's response time to higher-priority incidents that require a true emergency response.**

Response: Going beyond referring calls to 311, the PPD has been working to identify ways to respond to quality of life concerns through the newly formed Nuisance Task Force, bi-monthly Philadelphia Roadmap for Safer Communities (PRSC) Tactical meetings with the Office of Violence Prevention, collaborating with DBHIDS and other city departments to divert calls to other city agencies.

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- **Complete the "Technology Inventory" identified in the Crime Prevention & Violence Reduction Plan. Based on the findings of the Technology Inventory, which is intended to "[a]ssess and understand systems being operated at PPD" and [i]dentify additional technology and upgrades needed" create a plan for the**

implementation of new systems that will improve the reliability and accessibility of data throughout the police department.

Response: The PPD requested a high-level technology inventory in May 2022 through the Public Safety Partnership ([/www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/](http://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/)) and the report is expected to be received October 2022.

- **Eliminate unnecessary paper processes. There are many opportunities for PPD to communicate information electronically, which would lead to cost savings and decrease the amount of time spent by sworn personnel on unnecessary administrative tasks.**

Response: The PPD has been exploring ways to eliminate unnecessary paper processes, and is actively seeking to change practice and policy on paper usage, as well as identifying no or low cost, off the shelf processes with existing technology vendors to replace paper with electronic communications. For example, the Office of Professional Responsibility is moving to install needed software for Internal Affairs investigators. This software will streamline the business process, and reduce the use of paper reports at all levels.

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- **According to PPD, another mechanism for improving clearance rates is expanding and updating its forensic investigation capabilities. Funding for PPD's Office of Forensic Science (OFS) has increased only slightly over the past three years, despite increases in evidence volume. With regard recovered to shooting crimes in particular, the number of crime guns by PPD increased each year from 2019 to 2021.**

Response: Evidence submissions and requests for analysis have increased in every unit at the Office of Forensic Services. Scientific advances permit analyses and conclusions on evidence that were previously impossible. Forensic database searches and reports are used daily to aid investigations and court proceedings. These advances can provide actionable investigative leads that can exonerate the innocent, identify perpetrators, reveal serial patterns, solve cases, and prevent crime. The value of forensic-led investigations has been significantly discussed across the nation. Published data exists to show its effectiveness. It can lead to community trust, transparency, increased public safety and a significant return on investment. References available.

Page 61

- **Stout has not independently verified this estimate. It is important to note that increasing the budgeted headcount for OFS is only useful if it can fill the available positions, and its current staffing levels would suggest that may be difficult. As mentioned previously in the recruitment section of this report, PPD should conduct a comprehensive assessment of its recruitment efforts and develop a recruitment strategy that focuses on diversity, and specific skill-based positions.**

Response: PPD would like to acknowledge that recruitment and hiring is not conducted by the PPD. The PPD relies on City OHR and must wait for OHR to establish postings, lists, interviews, etc. An assessment on recruitment is a reasonable recommendation; however, it should also include an assessment of city hiring practices, especially for specialized positions. Vacancies increased during the last two years as hiring decreased. This may be associated with the COVID pandemic and its effects on city services. In FY23, the Office of Forensic Sciences (OFS) has seen increases in recruitment and hiring by OHR and anticipates filling all current vacancies.

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Philadelphia Police Response to City Controller Assessment
October 11, 2022

- **Share the methods and results of PPD's body-worn camera study. A study commissioned by PPD regarding officer and public perception of PPD's implementation and usage of body-worn cameras is ongoing. Once completed, PPD should share the results of this study with the public and utilize its findings for continued community engagement and to improve its operations and interactions with residents.**

Response: The PPD has been working in partnership with the Temple research team, and plan to support and participate in the dissemination efforts fully.

- **Enable and empower other City departments and agencies to participate in the development and implementation of public safety strategies.**

Response: The PPD agrees with this, but wanted to note that we have been working with Office of Violence Prevention PRSC team on Tactical meetings that brings together city agencies to respond to divert non-police related issues to those best served to respond.

Page 63


- **Establish a comprehensive co-response strategy considering voiced community needs. Soliciting feedback from the community surrounding co-responding methods and strategies will increase law enforcement's perceived legitimacy, accountability, and transparency while also helping to a build a co-response approach that meets the voiced needs of the community.**

Response: The PPD is about to launch a specialized unit to address the behavioral health calls, this unit will oversee the CIRT Teams, CIT and Police Assisted Diversion program. The PPD has established a very direct strategy to address the community's behavioral health concerns, along with alternate (aka non-police) responses to calls for service, which includes the utilization and expansion of the Mobile Emergency teams. The PPD has been working with the DBHIDS for the last several year in developing and implementing this strategy strategically in a systematic process.

Page 64:

- **Continue offering CIT training for all officers.** CIT training lowers the risk of serious injuries occurring to both officers and civilians in the event of an emergency interaction involving mental health. PPD's CIT training is voluntary, and the PPD currently requires CIT officers to take refresher trainings every two years. Encouraging all officers to take CIT training and participate in ongoing CIT education can result in greater protection for law enforcement and the public and help to improve the department's relationship with its community.

Response: Since 2007, the PPD has fully committed to CIT, operating under the guidelines of CIT International. CIT International calls for 25% to 30% of first responders to be voluntarily trained (<https://www.citinternational.org/resources/Documents/Research%20-%20Reports/CoreElements.pdf>). The PPD does not mandate CIT Training for all officers, but the Police Commissioner has set the goal of training 100% of PPD Officers in CIT. PPD has gone beyond the CIT International benchmark and now has over 60 percent of our 911 responders trained, it should be noted that not all officers are 911 responders, which is why CIT focuses on patrol officers. They are first on the scene and it is at that moment that the tone of the call can change. PPD's goal, mirrors that of CIT International to have an adequate number of patrol officers trained in order to ensure that CIT-trained officers are available at all times. Since 2007, PPD has had a waitlist for CIT training. Each CIT class averages 35



officers per class, and offer 10-11 classes per year. The success of the PPD CIT program lies in the experts (non-police) who volunteer to conduct the training.

In addition to the PPD CIT Program, we have recognized the role that Dispatchers have in the overall de-escalation process when dealing with 911 callers, but also when dispatching assignments to officers. As such, the PPD has designed a specialized training curriculum for Dispatchers. The PPD CIT Coordinator has trained all dispatchers in the 8-hour curriculum and all newly hired dispatchers get this training as well.

Additionally, PPD would like to point back to the PPD Directive that covers CIT refresher training, which is required every 2 years for officers. CIT training is not a 'certification'; CIT International does not certify officers. Officers are trained in tactics that do not require certification and recertification such as operation of police cars, use of control holds, etc. PPD has made a signification committed to training recruits, volunteer officers and providing regular refresher training for PPD personnel. It should be noted that our CIT Coordinator is CIT Certified by CIT International (<https://www.citinternational.org/CITCoordinatorCertificationCourse>).